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IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE REFORM OF INVESTMENT LAW
American Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2018)
By Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer*
Abstract: This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with alternative institutional processes for resolving investment disputes in terms
of their relative biases. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under
the rule of law, which underpins other goals attributed to investment law. The Article makes two
recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and
international institutions; second, institutional choice should vary in light of the different contexts
that States face.
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The tide is turning. Ferment is in the air. Reform or even transformation of foreign direct
investment governance appears on the way. 1 Different proposals are advanced, different proposals
trashed. Some defend the current arbitral system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
Others support the alternative of a multilateral investment court system. Some focus on market
mechanisms. Others on national sovereignty. What we lack is a framework for comparatively
assessing the range of institutional alternatives in light of their relative trade-offs. 2 This Article
provides such a framework. Our central claim is that all institutional alternatives are highly
imperfect because of the dynamics of participation within them, and thus criticism of one
institutional alternative without comparatively assessing the imperfections of real-life alternatives
is of little help and can make for bad public policy.
To assess trade-offs, one should address two issues in parallel: goal choice and institutional
choice. Scholars commonly start by specifying the goals of international law. 3 Law-and-economics
scholars focus on efficiency. 4 Rawlsian-oriented scholars focus on fairness 5 And realist-oriented
ones focus on interstate relations, power, and conflict. 6 For international investment law,
commentators conventionally describe these goals as fairness, resource allocation efficiency, and
peace. They stress the goals in different ways, but they have all been fundamental in contests over
the construction of the international investment law regime and its institutions over time. 7 We
recast these three goals in light of the broader principle of accountability under the rule of law,
which underpins (or, we argue, should underpin) these goals.
Inevitably, observers will disagree over how to specify goals and theorize justice. We argue
that, whatever one’s preferred goal, different institutional processes will mediate the pursuit of that
goal in highly imperfect ways. All institutional processes are imperfect, and all of them are
imperfect in different ways given the dynamics of participation within them. These dynamics result
in different minoritarian and majoritarian biases. Institutional choice is thus required, and to make
such choices, one needs to compare institutional processes.
After applying the comparative institutional analytic framework to a range of market,
political, and judicial options for resolving investment disputes, we conclude with two
recommendations. First, policymakers and scholars should pay greater heed to the place of
institutional complementarity in support of the rule of law in domestic jurisdictions as a central
consideration of the international investment regime. The argument for complementarity is that,
Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 113 AM. J. INT'L L
[…] (2018).
2
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (Our title intentionally borrows from this book.)
3
See e.g., Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J.
INT'L L 225 (2012) (applying a goal-based approach to assessing the effectiveness of international courts).
4
See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 532–33 (6th ed. 2003). For its application in
trade international law, see, Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 181 (2002) (“the WTO provisions
respecting renegotiation and the settlement of disputes over breach of obligations are carefully designed to facilitate
efficient adjustments to unanticipated circumstances”).
5
See e.g., AARON JAMES: FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012); THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
6
See e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS (2015) (focusing first on the “pillar of peace” in terms of the absence of armed conflict); JOSEPH M. GRIECO,
COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990) (noting that
realists believe that international cooperation in trade is governed by power).
7
See Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 465 (2013) (discussing the different goals of investment law).
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where possible, international processes should be structured not as substitutes but as complements
to domestic processes to assure government accountability. Second, policymakers and scholars
should recognize that countries face a range of contexts—in terms of capital endowment, market
size, ideology, institutional development, and historical legacy—and that these contexts will affect
their institutional choice.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly presents the historical backdrop of
investment regulation and dispute settlement, from its early roots to the setting of contemporary
debates over institutional reform. Part II examines three conventional normative goals for
investment protection: fairness, efficiency, and peace. It then frames them in light of the
overarching principle of accountability under the rule of law. Part III presents the comparative
institutional analytic framework with its focus on the dynamics of participation in institutional
processes so that trade-offs among institutional choices are assessed. Part IV applies the
framework to evaluate different market, political, and judicial alternatives for handling
international investment disputes. Part V concludes regarding the choice of options available given
the different contexts States face.
I. A NEW DEBATE IN INVESTMENT LAW
Emergence and Evolution of ISDS
Conflict over governmental treatment of property held by foreign nationals has existed for
centuries, but it intensified in the seventeenth century with the rise of States and mercantilist
competition among them. 8 To resolve conflicts, States turned to some of the methods still used
today, such as negotiation and mediation, as well as others that are no longer permissible, such as
armed intervention and the hiring of privateers to collect debts. 9
States submitted foreign investment conflicts to international adjudication as early as 1794,
when mixed arbitral commissions under the Jay Treaty addressed the settlement of debts to British
creditors. 10 Over time, multiple commissions and ad hoc tribunals were formed. They developed
international investment law in the shadow of State power and coercion, finding the law’s sources
in customary international law and general principles of law. 11
After World War II, industrialized countries tried to formalize their views of investment law
in treaties. 12 The United States, for example, promoted treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
See KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE
SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013).
9
See Grover Clark, The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 69596 (1933); Yves de la Briere, Evolution De La Doctrine Et De La Pratique En Matiere De Represailles, 22 RECUEIL
DE COURS 252, 258 (1928).
10
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. See also, Barton Legum,
Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794, 95 AM. SOC. INT’L. L. PROC. 202 (2001).
11
Alan Tzvika Nissel, A History of State Responsibility: The Struggle for International Standards (1870-1960) (2016)
(unpublished LLD dissertation, Helsinki University); Jason Webb Yackee, The First Investor-State Arbitration: The
Suez Canal Company v Egypt, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 401 (2016). See also, CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD:
PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985).
12
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
157, 168–70 (2005) (providing a detailed history of investment agreements and discussing their emergence to the
threat of uncompensated expropriations of investments).
8
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Navigation (“FCN treaties”) with its allies. 13 Under some FCN treaties, States could invoke
interstate dispute settlement (including before the International Court of Justice) by offering
diplomatic protection after their nationals had exhausted local remedies. 14
During the Post-War years, the United States and Western European countries increasingly
called for multilateral initiatives that would protect their and their nationals’ property in newly
decolonized territories. 15 Developing countries resisted these attempts by pioneering a
countervailing effort to create a New International Economic Order that recognized their sovereign
ownership of their natural resources and championed the exclusive use of domestic law and
institutions.16 As a result of this clash of perspectives, multilateral treaty-making initiatives
addressing substantive rights owed to foreign investors—then a highly contested matter—went
nowhere. 17 However, the negotiation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States proceeded, which created a mechanism for the use
of ad hoc tribunals to enforce investment commitments that might be separately made through
domestic law, contract, or treaty. 18 This convention created the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—an international organization that is part of the World Bank
Group. 19
ICSID had a slow start, administering mostly contractual disputes between foreign
investors and States. 20 A more favorable climate towards foreign direct investment developed,
abetted by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the
“Washington Consensus” for development policy. 21 This conjunction catalyzed the negotiation of
scores of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) containing ISDS, followed by increased litigation
under them. 22 Through these BITs, investors could bring claims without the need for home State
Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 805 (1958);
John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L.
302, 308 (2013) (“between 1946 and 1968, the United States negotiated more than twenty [FCN] agreements”).
14
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S.
No. 1965. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, April 3, 1961, United States-Vietnam, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S.
No. 4890. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449,
T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
15
See e.g., The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J. OF PUB. L. 115, 119–24
(1960).
16
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3201(S-VI) (May 1, 1974). See also Burns H. Weston, The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 437, 439
(1981).
17
See e.g. the abandonment of the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (1959), available
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/iia/docs/compendium/en/137%20volume%205.pdf. For an earlier effort,
see The Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners (1929), League of Nations, Document C. 174. M. 53. 1928.
18
Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1 ICSID REP. 23, 25 (1993).
19
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
20
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 224 (2008).
(describing low intake of mostly contract-based cases); ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 66-67 (2012)
21
See John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27 J. OF POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195
(2004).
22
See e.g., Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International
Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, (OECD Investment Division, OECD Working Paper on International
13
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espousal or (in most cases) the exhaustion of local remedies. Developing countries signed these
treaties in the hope of attracting investment and to reduce outside political interference, 23 but often
with limited information regarding their implications. 24
A dramatic rise in ISDS cases based on BITs generated a backlash against ISDS, which
intensified following the 2007 global financial crisis and the filing of politically-charged cases
implicating developed countries’ public policies. 25 The total number of ISDS cases is unknown
because arbitrations may be kept confidential, but UNCTAD reports that as of July 31, 2017, there
have been 817 publicly known ISDS cases, with 77 of them being filed in 2015 alone. 26 Investors
from Europe and North America have largely brought these claims, which have involved at least
114 countries as respondents 27. Many scholars and NGOs contended that ISDS developed from
coercive origins, reflects asymmetric power differentials, and, as a result, is unfair, imbalanced,
and illegitimate. 28 Although other scholars contested these depictions, 29 the media often adopted
this frame, emphasizing ISDS’ undemocratic and highly clandestine nature. 30
Investment, No. 2012/2, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers. (estimating that 93%
of BITs contain language on ISDS, based on a sample of 1,660 treaties).
23
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (2003)
(“[T]he willingness to accept internationalized dispute settlement on the part of the host country may well be motivated
by a desire to show commitment to the creation of a good investment climate.”); Ecuador v. United States, Expert
Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction of Professor W. Michael Reisman, 14-9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Apr. 4, 2012)
24
LAUGE SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2015). See e.g. Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment
Treaty Policy Framework Review: Government Position Paper 5 (June 2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/
files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf (suggesting changes to BITs because “were not in [its] long term interest”
and “the risks posed by such treaties were not fully appreciated at that time”).
25
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2008); Mattias Kumm, An Empire of
Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, 4 ESIL REFLECTION
3 (2015). For controversial cases, see e.g., Vattenfall AB & Others v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/6, Claimant’s Request for Arbitration (Mar. 30, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Vattenfall_Request_for_
Arbitration_001.pdf. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility
(UNCITRAL
2015)
(Jan.
20,
2017)
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7303_0.pdf
26
UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures (UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7)
Nov. 7 2017 available http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf.
27
Id..
28
See e.g., DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 225 (2008) (arguing that the protection offered to foreign investors under international
investment law “destabilize[s] the functioning of democratic processes, represented by other constitutional rules.”);
M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (4th ed. 2017); Alliance for Justice, Letter to
US Congressional Officials and US Trade Representative (Mar. 11, 2015), http://bit.ly/1GKLy5Q (last visited Dec.
31, 2017). See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (MICHAEL WAIBEL, ET AL. EDS., 2010)
(identifying some of the systemic concerns, such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic
accountability, a systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to respond to changes in economic
circumstances).
29
See e.g. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 477 (2009) (defending ISDS for the capacity to “stabilize” investor
expectations through the enforcement of rules).
30
Philip Morris Sues Australia Over Cigarette Packaging, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at B8; Charlie Fidelman, Maker
of Herbicide Sues Quebec; Dow Agrosciences Says Province Has No Scientific Basis for Ban, MONTREAL GAZETTE,
April 14, 2009, at A10. James Surowiecki, The Case Against Obama's Trade Agreements, THE NEW YORKER, (June
22, 2015).
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Governments responded to these criticisms and the risk of significant liability from large
ISDS awards. In the last decade, countries have terminated BITs with ISDS clauses (such as
Ecuador, Indonesia, and South Africa), withdrew from the ICSID Convention (notably, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela), threatened to leave it (including Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua),
or created new constraints on using ISDS (such as Norway and New Zealand). 31 In response to
this backlash, multiple reform proposals gradually emerged and many States created new model
BITs (e.g., Canada and the United States) or approaches (e.g., the European Union). 32
Challenges to the Current ISDS Model
For many commentators, the main problem with the current system of international
investment law enforcement is that it is based on a model of international commercial arbitration.
It relies on ad hoc tribunals of party-appointed arbitrators to resolve one-off disputes, even though
the disputes may involve public law and policy. 33 The tribunals interpret vague treaty rules—such
as provisions demanding ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and prohibitions against ‘measures
tantamount to expropriation.’ The system lacks an appeal process, other than a narrow annulment
proceeding that has been routinely criticized. 34 Conflicting decisions, sometimes involving the
same facts, raise rule-of-law and coherence concerns. 35 Because the arbitrators are appointed on
an ad hoc basis as opposed to a fixed term and are allowed to represent clients in other arbitrations
Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 410 (2010)
(discussing withdrawals from ICSID by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela). Ecuador and Venezuela sought to
renegotiate a number of their investment treaties. See United Nation Conference on Trade & Development, Recent
Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007–June 2008), 2 IIA Monitor 6 (2008). South Africa
suspended negotiations of investment treaties. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy
Framework
Review:
Government
Position
Paper
12,
12
(2009),
available
at
http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf; Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa Pushes PhaseOut of Early Bilateral Investment Treaties After at Least Two Separate Brushes with Investor-State Arbitration,
INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Sept. 23, 2012), available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/ 20120924_1. Others have
impose new restrictions Damon Vis Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-itsproposedmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty; ASEAN Australia-New Zealand FTA, ch. 11, art. 27(2).
32
Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
33
Van Harten and Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L. L. 121 (2006); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 92 (2013) (discussing criticism of ISDS proposing a new theoretical framework to
explain the investment treaty system).
34
ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 52(1) (limiting annulment review to challenges claiming that the Tribunal
“manifestly exceeded its powers,” was subject to “corruption,” or “failed to state the reasons” for its decision). On
criticism of the annulment system, see W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1988 DUKE L. J. 739, 787 (1989). On inconsistent application of review standards, see Dohyun Kim, The
Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an
Annulment-Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 243 (2011).
35
One can give numerous examples, but just to start, cf. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶¶ 189–230 (Sept. 5, 2008), with Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 322–45 (May 22, 2007); and Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
(Sept. 3, 2001), with CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Mar. 14,
2003). Cf. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005), and Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended
Consequences, APPEALS MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 258–59 (Karl Sauvant, ed.
2008) (suggesting that concerns about inconsistency are overblown).
31
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(conduct known as “double hatting”), they face incentives to decide cases in a manner that favors
the party that appointed them and to assure a flow of future cases, sparking challenges to their
independence and impartiality. 36 Collectively, these individuals constitute a small club of selfregulated decision-makers that lacks gender and geographic diversity. 37 Given the potential for
large damage awards, the threat of litigation, it is contended, can chill regulation. 38
In response to these critiques, States and commentators have proposed a range of
institutional reforms that are being discussed in a working group of the United Nations Conference
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 39 Prominently, the European Union (EU) has promoted
a multilateral investment court system where private investors retain standing to file claims directly
against States. At its core, this ‘systemic’ change would create a tribunal of first instance and an
appellate body, with the judges having fixed terms, paid a regular salary, and selected on a random
basis from a roster designated by States. 40 These judges accordingly would be restricted from
acting as counsel in other cases. The European Union has already concluded agreements
containing such a system—designed for bilateral relations, but including flexibilities for
multilateralization—with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, and indications that more
agreements with these features will follow. 41 As the world’s largest sender and receiver of foreign
direct investment and given that around half of all existing BITs involve EU members, the
European Union exercises considerable leverage in this reform process. 42
In contrast, Brazil and South Africa have proposed alternatives involving mediation,
possibly backed by State-to-State adjudication in which the State decides whether to espouse an
investor’s claims. 43 In parallel, India adopted a new model BIT that, while it incorporates ISDS,
Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration,
20 J. INT’L ECO. L. 301 (2017) (on double-hating); Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 647,
661, 672-5 (2017) (explaining different forms of bias in ISDS).
37
Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSPS. NO. 59
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_59.pdf (at that time, out of 631 appointments in 249 known
cases, only 41 of appointments were women).
38
See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in EVOLUTION
IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing that
regulatory chill is an important problem “inadequately addressed and often prematurely dismissed by legal scholars”).
39
Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
40
European Commission, Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform, Enhancing the Right to Regulate
and Moving from Current ad hoc Arbitration Towards an Investment Court (May 2015) 11
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF (“the EU should pursue the creation of one
permanent court” and offering some details.)
41
See generally, Colin M. Brown, A Multilateral Mechanism for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Some
Preliminary Sketches, 32 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 673, 682 (2017) (“The EU is currently engaging on a similar
basis with all of its negotiating partners (Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, the United States, China, Myanmar, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico etc.)”). See also ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States’ OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, 3;
Press Release, European Commission, The EU and Vietnam Finalize Landmark Trade Deal (Dec. 2,
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409; EU, Press Release, EU and Mexico Reach New
Agreement on Trade, April 21, 2018 (the agreement … includes the EU's new Investment Court System).
42
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015. REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE (2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
43
Brazil
Model
Cooperation
and
Facilitation
Investment
Agreement
(2015),
available
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4786. For discussion, see, Fabio Morosini & Michelle
Ratton Sanchez Badin, Reconceptualizing Investment Law from the Global South, in RECONCEPTUALIZING
INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2017); South
36
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conditions its use on the initial pursuit of remedies before domestic courts for at least five years. 44
India and China also have signaled interest in an appellate process, similar to that included in the
EU’s proposal. 45 While the U.S. previously defended ISDS, in October 2017, Robert Lighthizer,
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), signaled a potential shift in the U.S. position
regarding ISDS, suggesting that investors should rely on market mechanisms, such as political risk
insurance. 46 In this context, the ICSID Secretariat also has advanced consideration of an
‘incremental’ updating of the ICSID Regulations and Rules. 47
Much of the debate in the United States and Europe has focused on assessing whether the
EU’s proposed multilateral investment court system constitutes an improvement or even a
significant change. 48 The EU’s reform proposal and ISDS, however, are just two alternative
adjudicatory forms. Other adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory options exist, including marketoriented mechanisms such as insurance and contract. Thus, the broader question arises: What are
the relative trade-offs among different market, political, and judicial institutional alternatives for
addressing investment disputes?
II. NORMATIVE GOALS OF INVESTMENT LAW
To assess institutional options comparatively, we first examine three goals that have been
advanced to justify the current ISDS model: fairness, resource allocation efficiency, and peace.
We reconstruct these goals to place them in their best light in terms of justification and fit from a
perspective of reflective equilibrium. 49 As an increasing number of countries are both senders and
receivers of foreign direct investment, a greater number operate under a veil of ignorance as to
Africa
Protection
of
Investment
Act
22
of
2015,
Dec.
15,
2015
available
https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf Art. 13.5 (“The government may consent to [State-to-State] arbitration
in respect of investments covered by this Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.”).
44
Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016, Art. 15.2 available
http://mof.gov.in/reports/ModelTextIndia_BIT.pdf (establishing that before seeking international arbitration,
investors must seek justice before local authorities for at least 5 years).
45
For India, see, Id. Art. 29. For China, see, Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
46
Shawn Donnan, NAFTA: Bitter Differences over Nafta Break into the Open, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/058aa538-b387-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (“Mr Lighthizer … said the [ISDS] system
amounted to an unfair subsidy for businesses to invest overseas. ‘Why is it my job to encourage people to invest in
Mexico?’”).
47
ICSID,
Amendment
of
ICSID's
Rules
and
Regulations
available
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx (“ICSID launched
the current amendment process in October 2016 and invited Member States to suggest topics that merited
consideration. In January 2017, ICSID issued a similar invitation to the public inviting suggestions for rule
amendments.”). Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
48
Cf. Stephen Schwebel, The Proposals of the European Commission for Investment Protection and an Investment
http://isdsblog.com/wpCourt
System,
(May
17,
2016),
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/THEPROPOSALSOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.pdf; Charles Brower &
Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUMB. J. OF TRANSNT’L L 689 (2014); and Press Release, U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement by the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and
Equitable
International
Order,
(Feb.
4,
2016),
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17005&LangID=F#sthash.CLxvTf94.dpuf
(“the investment Court System is but an extension of ISDS, which suffers from many of the same fundamental flaws”)
49
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 18 (rev ed. 1971, 1999) (on reflective equilibrium); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE, at 52 (on constructive interpretation).
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whether they could be claimants or respondents in investment disputes. This trend is conducive to
an approach that is more balanced in terms of the characterization of investment law goals, which
we argue has developed over the past decade. We address these goals in three sub-sections in
which we build our argument from policymaker statements and ISDS jurisprudence as they have
developed, and (in doing so) we explain why a one-sided view of fairness, efficiency, and peace
from the perspectives of the investor and investment promotion is flawed (although supported in
early ISDS jurisprudence and policymaker statements). We then reframe these goals in terms of a
single, overarching, umbrella principle that we contend encompasses them analytically and is
conducive to their achievement consequentially—accountability under the rule of law.
Fairness
A first commonly expressed goal of the ISDS system, as advocated by its defenders, is
fairness. 50 ISDS, it is contended, provides access to justice for aggrieved investors claiming unfair
treatment. 51 From this perspective, ISDS provides a readily available, neutral adjudicatory
alternative for investors who are unable to obtain justice before national institutions that are
politically subservient or biased. 52 The creation of the ISDS system through ICSID supported this
aim. ICSID stressed the goal of fairness as a “paramount objective” through which it can make a
“real contribution . . . in restoring the climate of mutual confidence between States and
investors.” 53
It is commonly argued, in stylized fashion, that the investor faces what law-and-economics
scholars refer to as a time inconsistency or “hold-up” problem. In essence, the investor may have
bargaining power when it makes the investment, but that bargaining power diminishes after it
invests capital that it cannot easily and quickly withdraw when conditions deteriorate. 54 As ISDS
arbitrator and scholar Michael Reisman writes, “A common feature of foreign direct investment is
that the investor has sunk substantial capital in the host State… [such that] parity will cease and
things will tilt heavily in favor of the respondent State. Unless, that is, both sides appreciate that if
negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration will follow.” 55
Many tribunals, especially earlier in their development of ISDS jurisprudence, focused on
fairness toward investors. In this vein, the tribunal in the case Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada stated
that “[t]he aim of NAFTA seems to be… to present to investors the kind of hospitable climate that
Fairness generally refers both to fair treatment substantively (such as in terms of a “minimal standard of treatment”
or “fair and equitable treatment”) and procedurally (such as in terms of access to justice to defend substantive claims),
recognizing the rights of both investors and treaty parties. Our primary focus is on procedural fairness since this Article
assesses alternative institutional mechanisms of dispute settlement. Our broader point is that institutional choice
affects substantive outcomes, including through interpretation, so that procedural and substantive fairness are linked.
51
See e.g., Robert Volterra, International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility and Investor-State
Arbitration: Do Investors Have Rights?, 25 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L. J. 218, 220 (2010).
52
See e.g. JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2005) (“Whatever the rosy rhetoric about
the equality of treatment of nationals and foreigners, the very fact of being foreign creates an inequality. The
foreigner's obvious handicap--his lack of citizenship-is usually compounded by vulnerabilities with respect to many
types of influence: political, social, cultural.")
53
ICSID, 1985 Annual Report (1985) p. 4.
54
Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1063 (2004).
55
W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID
REV.—FILJ 185, 190-91 (2009). See also Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing
Sector in Developing Countries’ 41 INT’L ORG. 609 (1987) (providing some earlier empirical evidence).
50
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would insulate them from political risks or incidents of unfair treatment.” 56 In the words of the
Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v United Mexican States tribunal (with former ICJ Judge Greenwood
presiding), the focus of ISDS is on the “investor . . . seeking to enforce what it asserts are its own
rights under the treaty.” 57
However, since around the mid-2000s, ISDS decisions increasingly recognize that fairness
should not be viewed in one-sided terms focusing only on the investor, given that the State has a
responsibility to balance other welfare goals with the protection of investment. 58 Tribunals’
development of the principle of a State’s “right to regulate” in light of social welfare goals reflects
a broader concern of fairness toward other stakeholders. 59 Tribunals thus generally “balance”
investor rights and other claims affecting social welfare. 60 When they do so, they implicitly
recognize that representative governments should take into account the interests of other
stakeholders as well when they make decisions that can affect investors. This development is
captured in most contemporary BITs, 61 including the preamble of the CETA, which references the
protection of “investments and investors” with “the right of the Parties to regulate in the public
interest,” and the 2012 U.S. model BIT, which includes the “objective” of consistency “with the
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized
labor rights.” 62
Given the lack of an appellate mechanism in ISDS and the contentiousness of commentary,
debates continue regarding the conceptualization of fairness. Many contend—and we agree—that
limiting the concept of fairness to apply only to investors is itself unbalanced and asymmetric, and

Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 at ¶ 116 (Apr. 10,
2001).
57
Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on
Responsibility, ¶ 174 (Jan. 15, 2008).
58
See Alec Stone Sweet, Michael Chung, and Adam Saltzman, Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empirical
Analysis of Investment Arbitration, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, […] 15, (2017) (“As tribunals from Saluka forward
have made clear, investors cannot expect regulatory arrangements to be frozen”); ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN
GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 190
(2017) (“in the vast majority of awards, tribunals made good faith efforts to take seriously the state’s ‘right to
regulate’”); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment
Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1071 (2010) (arguing that tribunals are increasingly engaged in a “balancing
process” and are “called upon to make value judgments”).
59
See e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
70 (Apr. 27, 2006) [hereinafter El Paso v. Argentina] (“[A] balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both
State sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development
of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow”); Total S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, paras. 114–34 (Dec. 27, 2010) (States “do not
thereby relinquish their regulatory powers nor limit their responsibility to amend their legislation in order to adapt it
to change and the emerging needs and requests of their people”).
60
See e.g., Waste Management v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3 Award (April 30, 2004) ¶ 110; Chemtura
Corporation v Government of Canada (UNCITRAL) Award of 2 August 2010, paras 123,134–38 (noting Canada’s
‘’margin of appreciation”)’ Saluka v. Czech Republic, supra note 60, at ¶ 114; Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, paras. 189 –258, (Sept. 5, 2008) (looking to WTO case law interpreting
GATT Article XX to balance rights and obligations of States and investors).
61
See Howse, supra note…, at 29 (58% of BITs negotiated between 2012-2014 contain explicit public policy
exceptions).
62
CETA, supra note 47, at Preamble; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Preamble [hereinafter 2012 U.S.
Model BIT] available at http://www. ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
56
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thus unfair. 63 Such asymmetry has raised questions regarding the evenhandedness of ISDS, and
thus of the international rule of law. Some contend that BITs should be revised to create explicit
obligations for investors and the right to sue investors for breaching those obligations; indeed some
new BITs include obligations on investors. 64 Yet even if BITs are not so revised, broader interests
are still encompassed within the State’s right to regulate and balance social welfare goals.
In our view, focusing on fairness only toward investors builds from a number of flawed
assumptions and can create a structural tilt against State regulation and the interests of other
stakeholders represented by the State. First, a one-sided focus is based on assumptions that can
overstate the relative position of the State in relation to investors, which are often large powerful
corporations from comparatively rich nations that have many options to protect themselves. Rather
than being simply law-abiding, risk-taking victims of excessive, opportunistic governments,
investors may have ‘unclean hands’ and their actions can damage the environment, contribute to
the violation of human rights, and raise other social concerns.
Second, a one-sided focus on fairness obscures the fact that investors may be in a much
stronger position than other stakeholders in relation to the host State through their ability to lobby,
bargain contractually, obtain insurance, and harness home State diplomacy. In practice, investors
may procure investments under less than transparent conditions to the prejudice of other
stakeholders within the State. While it is possible that some governments have the institutional
capacity to perform a proper balancing of stakeholder interests, the threat of using ISDS can further
advantage well-resourced foreign investors, creating a structural tilt against State regulation that
is responsive to the concerns of affected citizens.
Third, a one-sided view presumes domestic courts cannot be trusted. Yet, if this is the case,
then domestic stakeholders can be prejudiced as well, but they have no access to a specialized
forum to sue investors. An asymmetric focus on fairness in the definition and interpretation of
foreign investment law constrains host governments’ ability to hold powerful, corporate actors
accountable in situations where the alternative of relying on citizen suits before domestic courts is
limited or non-existent. Moreover, a traditional ISDS model of substitution could inhibit the
development of independent, national adjudicatory processes to fairly assess and balance the
different interests at stake. 65
Efficiency
A second goal of ISDS is to promote resource allocation efficiency through reducing the
State’s cost of capital and thus increasing national welfare and supporting economic development.
See e.g., Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18
J. INT’L ECON. L. 861 (2015).
64
See Howard Mann et al., IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, Int’l
Inst. for Sustainable Development (2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_
model_int_handbook.pdf (explaining reasons to incorporate investor obligations into investment treaties). For a view
that BITs already demand some duties to investors, see, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor Philippe Sands QC, 30 November 2017 (suggesting
that the company had an obligation of obtain “social license”). For new BITs including obligations of investors, see,
Reciprocal Investment Promotion And Protection Agreement Between The Government Of The Kingdom Of
Morocco And The Government Of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria Art. 18 (Dec. 3, 2016) available
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5409 (establishing that investors must uphold the human
rights and act in accordance with core labour standards).
65
See infra notes…. [on substitution mechanisms]
63
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The World Bank stressed this goal in creating ICSID and supporting the ensuing ISDS system. In
the words of one of the delegates participating in the negotiation of the ICSID Convention:
“economic development could not be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would
not obtain capital unless they provided adequate [legal] guarantees.” 66 Law and economics
scholars highlight this goal. As Alan Sykes writes, “A credible promise of monetary compensation
to investors, by contrast, in an amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much further to reduce
investment risk and to achieve the developing countries’ goal of lowering the foreign cost of
capital.” 67
For a rational foreign investor, its choice to invest is a function of the margin of profit
needed in light of the risk of investing. The investor’s decision is a question of opportunity costs;
the greater the risk, the more profit it will require if it is to invest in a location. The cost of capital
for investors implicates a State’s cost of capital directly and indirectly. States depend on
investment, whether public or private, and whether foreign or domestic. Capital inflows into States
can take different forms—through loans, bonds, and foreign direct investment. Directly, higher
investment risk increases the State’s borrowing costs because lenders and bond holders demand
higher interest rates. Indirectly, higher risk premiums for foreign investors correlate with higher
borrowing costs for States. 68 Overall, the risks associated with investing in a State affect the State’s
cost of capital for investment and thus resource allocation efficiency.
From the perspective of efficiency, the titles and preambles of many BITs reflect the goal
of efficiency in terms of promoting private investment. 69 Accordingly, some investment tribunals
have focused on investment promotion in interpreting BIT provisions. 70 In doing so, they can
develop jurisprudential standards that appear to create a bias against any new regulation that may
prejudice an investor. The Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico, for example, maintained that the investor
must “know beforehand any and all rules and regulation that will govern its investments, as well
as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives.” 71 This controversial
A. BROCHES, GEN. COUNS., NOTE TRANSMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES (1961), REPRINTED IN INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISP., 2 THE HISTORY OF THE SID CONVENTION: PART 1 AT 244 (1968). See also, Report of the Executive Directors
supra note 24 at para. 9 (1965) (ICSID was “designed … [as] a major step toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private international investment into territories, which is the primary
purpose of the Convention”).
67
Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 631, 643 (2005).
68
See Jeswald Salacuse, Of Handcuffs and Signals: Investment Treaties and Capital Flows to Developing Countries,
58:1 Harv. Intl L.J. (2017).
69
Id., at 130-131 (citing BIT preambles and titles). See e.g., 2008 German Model Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement
and
Reciprocal
Protection
of
Investments,
available
at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf at Preamble [hereinafter 2008 German Model BIT]
(“recognizing that the encouragement and contractual protection of such investments are apt to stimulate private
business initiative and to increase the prosperity of both nations”).
70
See e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID REP. 518 (2005) (the Tribunal found it “legitimate to resolve
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favor the protection of covered investments” because BITs intend to “create
and maintain favorable conditions for investments”); [Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, ¶¶ 173; 183
(London Ct. Int’l Arb. July 1, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/. (“The stability of the legal and business
framework is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”).]
71
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶154 (May 29, 2003), 43 ILM
133 (2004) [hereinafter Tecmed Award].
66
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and expansive phrasing of the standard suggests that regulation should be frozen and not developed
in light of experience and democratic choice.
Yet, the dominant trend of investment tribunals is to balance investor protection with a
State’s right to regulate when deciding on investment claims, such as claims regarding alleged
unfair treatment or indirect expropriation. This approach implicitly conceptualizes resource
allocation efficiency from a broader social welfare perspective. 72 That is, from a law-andeconomics perspective, resource allocation efficiency involves the optimality of investment
protection, and not investment promotion per se. Otherwise, ISDS will have an anti-regulatory
bent since the best way to attract investment would be to limit government regulation. Absolute
investment protection is not optimal, and thus not efficient, because it precludes the balancing of
other social welfare goals. Indeed, Anthea Roberts rightly points out that jurisprudence that focuses
solely on investor protection could trigger State exit from the investment regime, “undermining
investor protection and the promotion of efficient investments in the long term.” 73
Whether ISDS actually catalyzes investment is forcefully debated, as is the broader
question whether increased foreign investment is even desirable as a development strategy. 74 As
Robert Howse writes, the argument that BITs support development through incentivizing foreign
investment is based on three premises: (i) that additional investment boosts economic growth and
development; (ii) that treaty protection will incentivize additional investment; and (iii) that treaty
protection is cost-effective compared to other State incentives for foreign investment. 75 All of these
premises are contested, both empirically and in terms of economic theory. 76
The goal of resource allocation efficiency is an important one affecting aggregate national
welfare and the prospects of economic growth and development. Yet, from a law-and-economics
perspective, the goal of resource allocation efficiency should be framed in terms of optimal
investment to advance social welfare, not investment protection per se.
Peace

See supra notes… On the logic espoused in these cases; see, e.g., Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Treaty Law and
the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions, 78 MODERN L. REV. 793, 811 (2015) (“the logic
that investment should be protected, not for the sake of individual economic interests but for the purpose of
contributing to enhancing social welfare”).
73
Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353,
380 (2015).
74
For a literature review, see Christian Bellak, How Bilateral Investment Treaties Impact on Foreign Direct
Investment:
A
Meta-Analysis
of
Public
Policy
(2013),
available
at
http://www2.gre.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/822705/Christian-Bellak-How-BilateralInvestment-TreatiesImpact-on-Foreign-Direct-Investment-A-Meta-analysis-of-Public-Policy.pdf (“In a nutshell, the positive impact of
BITs on FDI has not been confirmed empirically”).
75
Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework, (Forthcoming in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION (Helene Ruiz-Fabri, ed.,) available https://www.iilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf p 14.
76
Id. Foreign investment law differs from trade law in that it is not grounded in a widely accepted economic theory,
such as the theory of comparative advantage for trade. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference
Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 7 (distinguishing the case for free trade and
for liberal capital flows); see also THOMAS PIKETTY, LE CAPITAL AU XXI SIECLE 120-21 (2013) (dismissing the idea
that countries that have seen rapid growth and development especially in Asia received massive FDI).
72
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A third normative goal of investment dispute settlement is to reduce interstate conflict and
thus support peaceful and cooperative international relations. 77 From this perspective, the
adjudication of disputes involving foreign investors helps ensure that investment disputes are
resolved by law instead of force or other forms of coercion. Otherwise, investment disputes could
trigger costly diplomatic confrontations between the host State and the investor’s home State that
could escalate and possibly undermine cooperation in other areas.
This goal was central to the World Bank’s promotion of the ICSID regime. Ibrahim Shihata
stressed the goal—perhaps opportunistically—at a time when the volume of foreign direct
investment in developing countries was declining as a consequence of debt crises. 78 According to
Shihata, ISDS was superior because it effectively encourages investment “without inviting the
abuses of diplomatic protection” of the past. 79 This framing particularly resonated among Latin
American countries that had suffered reprisals by the United States and European powers in the
form of “gunboat diplomacy” 80 to protect their nationals—actions that generated resistance among
Latin American nations to join a system for the international adjudication of investment disputes. 81
Because the home States of investors historically used coercive methods to resolve
investment disputes, some scholars defend ISDS by recalling the past. For example, Judge
Schwebel stresses that “the displacement of gunboat diplomacy by international arbitration is a
very real achievement.” 82 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, a U.S. negotiator of the ICSID
Convention, writes in a NAFTA case that “the essential feature of investor-state arbitration, as it
has developed since the ICSID Convention of 1965, . . . is that controversies between foreign
investors and host states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states.” 83
This goal has a long pedigree and links with what is arguably the foremost goal of public
international law: to ensure international peace. 84 Assessing whether this historical depiction
overstates the past use of coercive methods or, rather, understates the coercive methods used today,
See 2 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
STATES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, pt. 1, at 303 (1968)
(explaining that the ICSID Convention would “serve … the cause of international co-operation generally” and that
the Convention was better than the existing situation of diplomatic protection “which would transform the controversy
into a dispute between States”). For a discussion on different understandings of the de-politicization goal, see Roberts,
Triangular Treaties, supra note 73 at 388-95.
78
ICSID, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1984) (statement of Ibrahim Shihata arguing that “in an era in which it has become
increasingly difficult for a developing country to obtain official development assistance and in which foreign private
investment has in recent years diminished markedly, ICSID membership cannot be but a positive element in a
developing country's policies.").
79
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and
MIGA, 1 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 1, 25 (1986).
80
SIR JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919–1979: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE 39
(1981).
81
In 1964, at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank in Tokyo Latin-American countries
voted together against the ICSID Convention. For a detailed discussion the negative attitude toward the Convention
in Latin America, see Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 256
(1971).
82
Stephen M. Schwebel, Keynote Address: In Defence of Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 2 available
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/2/14169776244680/schwebel_in_defence_of_bits.pdf.
83
Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (Jan. 15, 2008),
Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Lowenfeld, para 1.
84
See Ratner, supra note…; Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279,
(2018).
77
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is beyond this Article’s scope. We nonetheless note that self-help through the use of force to
recover debts is now prohibited under international law, so that arguments regarding the goal of
peace arise in a very different context. 85 In part because of this change, many question the
continued usefulness of discussing “depoliticization” in the contemporary context. Martins
Paparinskis, for example, contends that it has weak empirical foundations and “has no self-evident
use for conceptualizing and resolving modern challenges.” 86 Even with ISDS, he argues, “the
dispute retains the same degree of political sensitivity.” 87
We add to the debate that the conventional conception of ISDS in terms of depoliticization,
once more, has had a rather one-sided, pro-investor focus—it promotes ISDS to advance this end.
We contend that the goal of international cooperation between States is indeed an important one,
but that it should be viewed equally in terms of reducing constraints on States’ ability to adapt
regulation to changing contexts in light of experience and new information, including in relation
to global and transnational initiatives—think, for example, of the policies behind the “tobacco
carve-out” from using ISDS under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 88
Accordingly, we focus on the relative impact of institutional design on the furtherance of
the goal of international cooperation and peace. Although international disputes can become
politicized under any system, the level of politicization can vary in light of institutional design. In
international trade law, for example, the U.S. administration currently threatens to undermine the
dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by blocking the appointment
of members to the WTO Appellate Body. 89 Commentators worry about the long-term
consequences for trade relations if this dispute settlement system erodes. For the investment law
world, this development raises concern if ISDS were replaced by a court built on the WTO
Appellate Body model. The goals of cooperative and peaceful interstate relations, in other words,
continue to raise issues of institutional choice.
Reframing the Goals: Protection of the Rule-of-Law
We contend that the three conventional goals of investment protection reflected in ISDS—
fairness, efficiency, and peace are linked both analytically and consequentially to a broader
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
86
See Martins Paparinskis, Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 SELECT
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271–82 (James Crawford ed., 2010) (discussing
the concept of diplomatic protection and depoliticisation).
87
Id., at 273. See also, Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala, and Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization, diplomacy,
and development: Do investment treaties de-politicize investment disputes?, 107 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 239, 240
(2018) (noting ongoing pressure on top developing country officies to resolve disputes); and JONATHAN BONNITCHA,
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY
REGIME (2017) chs. 7 and 8.
88
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement permitted treaty parties to “block corporations from using the [ISDS]
mechanism to receive compensation for commercial damages resulting from tobacco control measures”—an example
being those promoted transnationally by the World Health Organization. See Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer, A
Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-Out, 16:2 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY, L. & ETHICS (2016).
89
Jennifer A. Hillman, Independence at the Top of the Triangle: Best Resolution of the Judicial Trilemma? 111 AM.
J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 364-368 (2017); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT'L
L. 225, 225-6 (2017).
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principle—accountability under the rule of law. In the words of ICJ Judge James Crawford, one
of the main roles “of international law is to reinforce, and on occasions to institute, the rule of law
internally.” 90 In our view, the rule of law provides the guiding principle for international
investment law. The concept resonates with traditional justifications for investment law, such as
the obligation not to “deny justice,” 91 contemporary arbitral jurisprudence regarding the
“minimum standard of treatment” and “fair and equitable treatment,” 92 and the preamble and other
provisions of treaties such as CETA and those based on the 2012 U.S. model BIT. 93
The meaning of the “rule-of-law” is, however, contested. 94 Many legal philosophers focus
on abstract formal conceptions of the rule of law, such as the law’s generality, equality of
application, and certainty. Lon Fuller notably advanced eight elements that constitute conditions
for the rule of law—law should be “general, publicized, prospective, clear, non-contradictory,
compliable, consistently applied, and reasonably stable.” 95 Joseph Raz specified similar principles
and divided them into two groups, the first focused on formal standards that provide certainty and
predictability to guide action, and the second focused on legal machinery to make the first
effective. 96 These formal concepts of the rule of law highlight the coordinative function of norms

James Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law, 24 ADELAIDE L. REV. 3 (2003).
See e.g., Edwin Borchard, The Minimum Standard of the Treatment of Aliens, 1939 PROCEEDINGS, AM. SOC. INT.
LAW 51-63 (stating “[f]air courts, readily open to aliens, administering justice honestly, impartially, without bias or
political control, seem essentials of international due process.”); Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)
(U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1109 at para. 128 (citing Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266, 284) (a case based on a FCN treaty: "arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as
something opposed to the rule of law. . .It is a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least
surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”). See also, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award,
¶ 178 (Oct. 12, 2005), http://tinyurl.com/4k8pr35 (finding against the complainant because: “Such proceedings are
provided for in all legal systems and for much the same reasons. One therefore cannot say that they were ‘opposed to
the rule of law.’ … Arbitrariness is therefore excluded”); Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 269 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/3duq8wh;
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See e.g., Waste Management, supra note …, at ¶ 98 (the minimum standard of treatment is “infringed by conduct
attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic,
is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading
to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in
judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candor in an administrative process”). See also, Alain
Pellet, Police Power and the State’s Right to Regulate, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - THE FIRST
50 YEARS OF ICSID, (Kinnear et al. eds. 2016).
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See e.g., CETA, supra note 47, at Preamble. (“[Recognising] the importance of … the rule of law for the
development of international trade and economic cooperation”). Newer versions of BITs provide that “‘fair and
equitable treatment’ includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”
See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty supra note 62 at Art. 5(2)(a).
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Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law An Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 138-44
(2002); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and The Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan
C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
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See Charles Sampford, Reconceiving the rule of law for a globalizing world, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 9, 14 (Spencer Zifcak ed., 2005). Sampford builds from Fuller’s list of eight ways in which a legal system can
fail. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Rev. Ed. 1969). Fuller defends, in his words, a “procedural version
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by providing a framework against which individuals and organizations might orient action,
interact, and plan. 97
The rule of law becomes more contested when it includes substantive norms and goals,
representing political choices, such as a democratic form of government, participation,
deliberation, and individual rights. Leading philosophers and social theorists, such as Ronald
Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, Jurgen Habermas, and Philip Selznick, advance different substantive
conceptions to attend to broader values realized through law. 98 In different ways, United Nations
reports on the rule of law incorporate substantive conceptions, 99 as do reports of the Bretton Woods
institutions supporting market-oriented development policies. 100
The rule of law, in our view, is best conceptualized from a socio-legal perspective that
focuses on goals and practices. The goal of the rule of law is to create restraints on government in
order to provide security and predictability so that individuals and firms can plan their pursuits and
do so without fear. 101 Its basic conception is opposition to the arbitrary exercise of power.
Ultimately, for the rule of law to become effective, it must be institutionalized as part of a culture
of appropriate conduct. 102 From a socio-legal perspective, the rule of law provides restraints on
arbitrary State behavior, backed by norms that enable people to reasonably know what is required
of them, combined with the institutionalization of these norms so that they “count as a source of
restraint and a normative resource” that may be used in practice. 103 Applied to investment law, the
rule of law provides foreign investors with the security and predictability that State commitments
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2008) (“Law in the first sense requires
the existence of certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for people’s behavior, as well as a basis for
decision by the courts.”).
98
See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 259 (1985) (proposing the ideal of rule as a public conception of
individual rights); Waldron, supra note 101, at 1 (favoring a “procedural and argumentative conception of the Rule of
Law”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 453 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (legitimacy as “procedural rationality”); P. SELZNICK WITH P. NONET
AND H.M. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 253 (1969) (“Procedure cannot be ‘due’ if it does not
conform to the canons of rational discourse”).
99
See e.g. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (rule of law as a “principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards”).
100
See Erik Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns
and Reformers’ Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW (Eric
Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003); Kathryn Hendley, The Rule of Law and Economic Development in a Global Era,
in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sara ed., 2004); and Patrick McAuslan, Law,
Governance and the Development of the Market: Practical Problems and Possible Solutions, in GOOD GOVERNMENT
AND LAW: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25, 42 (Julio Faundez ed., 1997) (“[In]
World Bank publications… the rule of law… is being redefined to emphasize its role in facilitating the enforcement
of private contracts so that law reform to advance the rule of law is the same as law reform to advance the market
economy”).
101
Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 45, 60
(Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009).
102
Id., at 58-60. Tamanaha thus defines the rule of law to mean that “government officials and citizens are bound by
and abide by the law.” Brian Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, SINGAPORE J. OF L. STUDIES
232, 233 (2012).
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Id. See also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 141 (2004); PHILIPPE NONET
& PHILIP SELZNICK, TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 53 (“[T]he rule of law is better understood as a distinctive institutional
system than as an abstract ideal”).
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to them will be upheld. It creates, in the words of investment tribunals, “legitimate expectations”
on the part of investors, subject to the State’s “right to regulate” to advance social welfare. 104 To
the extent one views the rule of law as also involving processes of participation and deliberation
of the governed regarding the institutions that govern them, then that has implications for
investment dispute settlement as well, highlighting the role of domestic institutions that are closer
to the governed, with international mechanisms serving as complements to them, as addressed
below. 105
We contend that the socio-legal framing of the rule of law is linked with our
conceptualization of the three goals of investment law discussed above both analytically and
conceptually. 106 First, the rule of law principle can be viewed analytically as incorporating the
concept of procedural fairness in terms of law’s inner morality (in Fuller’s sense when viewed in
terms of actual practice). 107 John Rawls, for example, defines the rule of law as “the regular,
impartial, and in this sense fair, administration of law.” 108 Notably, the concept of fairness under
the rule of law is symmetric for all stakeholders, and thus does not privilege foreign investors; for
other stakeholders in the investment process, for example, the rule of law helps ensure that
government officials do not engage in corrupt transactions or otherwise favor foreign investors
over other interests. 109 Viewed consequentially, there is good reason to believe that the rule of law
contributes to fairness, as the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson stressed in the conclusion of his
magisterial study of English enclosure laws. 110
Second, the rule of law principle can be viewed analytically as incorporating the concept
of resource allocation efficiency when law is viewed in terms of “planning” that helps to coordinate
behavior—as in Scott Shapiro’s work. 111 Those who stress efficiency as a goal, however, are
generally consequentialists. From a consequentialist perspective, the rule of law contributes to
resource allocation efficiency and thus economic development by increasing transparency,
preventing corruption, and reducing political risk. 112 Once again, it does not do so from a onesided focus on investment promotion, but rather from a broader social welfare perspective. Indeed,
some empirical evidence shows that, in most contexts, decreased risk in a country’s political and
legal system—including indicators for law and order—correlates with higher levels of
investment. 113
Krygier, supra note 101, at 60.
See infra notes… [on international mechanisms as complements].
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See also Howse, supra note…, at 34 (noting three rule of law rationales that can be read as linked to efficiency (to
address the hold-out problem), fairness (to improve the rule of law), and peace (depoliticization).
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See Fuller, supra note….
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RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note…, at 235.
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See Garcia et al, supra note 66 at 871 (“even if ISDS strengthens the rule of law for one class of stakeholders
(investors), this is no substitute for the larger systemic evaluation of ISDS in terms of the rule of law for all
stakeholders, not just favored investors.”). See e.g., Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case
No. ARB/13/26, Award (27 Dec. 2016) (The tribunal ruled that one purpose of the investment system is to promote
the rule of law, which precluded offering protection to investor that engaged in unlawful activities). For an example
of the treatment of corruption in an ISDS case, see World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, ¶ 120 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
110
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See e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (providing “a planning theory of law” that conceptualizes “legal
systems” as “institutions of social planning”).
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Third, the rule of law links analytically with the concept of peace by stressing the use of
law to resolve conflicts in lieu of power. To turn to a consequentialist perspective, the rule of law
can reduce international conflict that otherwise arises when State authorities seize foreign investor
property or otherwise deny foreign investors justice. Democratic peace theory provides evidence
that democracies grounded in the rule of law are less likely to go to war against each other. 114 Once
more, the rule of law principle does not have a one-sided focus on investors—i.e. focusing on a
private right of standing to depoliticize investment disputes—but rather one that encompasses all
stakeholders in the investment process.
From a socio-legal perspective, the ultimate challenge for the rule of law is its
implementation in practice, which will be mediated by social institutions. Because law is
frequently ambiguous, often involving the interplay of standards, rules, and exceptions, the
application of the rule of law will always be contested. 115 No legal process is “discretion-free”
because law’s meaning is mediated through the operation of legal and non-legal institutions and
interactions involving people. Thus, any meaningful understanding of the rule of law must be
based on cultures of practice embedded in institutions.
One of the disconnects in the field of ISDS is that proponents focus on the need for
investment arbitration because of challenges with the domestic rule of law, while opponents focus
on the failure of ISDS to adhere to rule-of-law standards. Yet, both of these mechanisms are subject
to severe imperfections. Thus, any meaningful choice between them from a rule-of-law perspective
must engage with a comparison of their trade-offs, along with those of other institutional
alternatives. This calls for comparative institutional analysis.
III. THE FRAMEWORK: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
We contend that our construction of the goals of investment law place them in their best
light in terms of justification and fit. Yet, we recognize that the framing of investment law’s goals
is contentious so that we may not convince all readers. Thus, we insist on a broader point in this
Article—the need for comparative analysis—even if one disagrees with our construction of
international investment law’s goals. However one frames the goals of investment law, those goals
must be pursued through institutional mechanisms involving interested actors and different
decision-making processes. 116 Thus, goal choice must be complemented by institutional analysis,
whatever the goal may be. For institutional analysis, the key question is: compared to what? Neil
Komesar powerfully developed comparative institutional analysis and applied it to U.S. domestic

Industrialized Economies, ECON. MGMT. & FIN. MARKETS, 60, 64 (2011). Cf. Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and
Foreign Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477 (2014) (noting the limits of political risk theories).
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See e.g. MICHAEL DOYLE, LIBERAL PEACE: SELECTED ESSAYS 4 (2012) (referring to States “founded on such
individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberty, private property, and elected
representation” and notably “freedom from arbitrary authority”). For a precursor, see IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL
PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795).
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law. 117 Other scholars have applied the framework to European Union law and WTO law, but, to
our knowledge, not explicitly to international investment law. 118 We do so here.
In critiquing or advocating a particular institutional choice, one should not focus on the
defects of a single institution while failing to apply the same rigor to its alternatives. Institutions
should rather be assessed from a comparative perspective, one that avoids ideal characterizations
in favor of analysis that takes account of real-life institutional pathologies. Just as Ronald Coase
labeled economic analyses that compare an existing institution (say the legislative process) with
an “ideal” alternative (say the market) as “blackboard economics,” 119 much international legal
scholarship similarly fails to compare institutional alternatives, especially legal processes, that take
account of their real-world complexity.
A more realistic assessment of the possible approaches for resolving investment disputes
should take account of three central points: first, that the pursuit of any normative goal is mediated
by social decision-making processes; second, that these decision-making processes are biased in
different ways because of the dynamics of participation within them; and third, that any meaningful
public policy analysis must involve comparative institutional analysis of real-world (rather than
ideal) alternatives. The key is to assess institutional alternatives comparatively. To do so, one looks
at such factors as numbers, complexity, and per capita stakes that shape the dynamics of
participation. One then assesses the implications of these dynamics on different forms of bias in
institutional decision-making.
Participation: Numbers, Complexity, and Per Capita Stakes
A focus on participation in institutional decision-making processes should address both the
benefits and costs of participation. Understanding the role of numbers, complexity, and per capita
stakes is critical for this analysis. Where there are large numbers of affected individuals who have
low per capita stakes, serious collective action problems arise. The benefits may be large in
aggregate, but they are not large enough for individuals to attend closely to complex issues.
Applied to international investment law, this analysis suggests that individuals are unlikely to
organize in opposition to expansive investor protections or ISDS, whether based on an investment
contract, a national law, or an international treaty. In contrast, investors have high per capita stakes
in investment projects, which creates the incentive for them to assess benefits and costs. Investors
thus may deploy significant resources to shape investment law norms and their application. They
are, in sum, well-positioned to lobby for investment protection ex ante and to litigate for favorable
interpretations and compensation ex post. 120
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The organization of interests in relation to institutional decision-making has ex ante and ex
post dimensions—involving dynamics of participation before and after a dispute arises. The
investing firm often has much better information regarding environmental and social risks at stake
from a prospective investment, but it may not disclose them. After harms become evident,
organizing becomes less demanding for affected communities. This dynamic particularly occurs
with local decision-making, where numbers are smaller and so it is easier for individuals to
overcome collective action problems when harms become salient.
Organized groups—what Komesar calls “catalytic sub-groups”—may have interests in
common with the local majority and spur their increased participation. These groups can publicize
harms and rally residents to oppose investment projects and place pressure on government
officials. 121 Today, the development of social media can assist their mobilization efforts.
International investment dispute settlement thus has analogues with local government decisions
since disputes can pit outsider investors against a local community. This local ‘majority’ may, in
turn, not take account of the broader social and development concerns of the province or nation,
much less the costs imposed on a foreign investor with high sunk costs. 122 Seen from this
perspective, it is not surprising that a number of ISDS cases involve municipalities denying or
cancelling permits to operate locally. 123
Decision-making: Minoritarian and Majoritarian Bias
Institutional decision-making inevitably involves the push and pull of different forces in
light of the dynamics of participation. These forces give rise to different forms of minoritarian and
majoritarian bias. 124 Minoritarian bias appears when well-organized, discrete interests shape
policy. In investment law, this could involve a foreign investor colluding with a domestic
government official or, alternatively, a domestic business seeking an advantage over a foreign
investor. Majoritarian bias, in contrast, appears when the many oppress the few, imposing higher
costs on them.
Assessing these different forms of bias requires a benchmark, which we view in terms of
weighing the welfare of all stakeholders equally. While some law-and-economics scholars see the
benchmark objectively in terms of resource allocation efficiency, an external, objective assessment
becomes difficult, if not impossible, when goals are incommensurate, as they invariably are with
public policy. Our focus thus centers on participation in social decision-making processes. From
a law-and economics perspective, participation and social welfare are closely related since, as

Komesar, supra note 2 at 84.
Id. at 79 (“Land use decisions by small jurisdictions are classic examples of instances in which large numbers with
lower per capita impacts [residents of developed parcels] can dominate small numbers with higher per capita stakes
[residential developers or owners of undeveloped land]”).
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See e.g., Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000) (concerning the denial of
construction permit and designation of an ecological zone); Tecmed supra note 74 (concerning a denial of permit for
landfill in a rapidly growing municipality); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 5-25 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), 48 I.L.M. 1038 (concerning a denial of mining permit in response to pressure from a
local indigenous community). For an excellent discussion of regulatory takings cases, see Steven R. Ratner,
Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L.
475 (2008).
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Komesar writes, “participation is the heart of key economics concepts such as transaction costs,
externalities and resource allocation efficiency.” 125
These different forms of bias in participation in social decision-making processses have
distinct dynamics and impacts in the investment law context. For example, minoritarian bias
favoring foreign investors may adversely affect domestic stakeholder interests because of adverse
environmental and social impacts and other externalities. In contrast, majoritarian bias may
adversely affect foreign investors but have different short- and long-term effects on domestic
stakeholders. In the short term, domestic politics might favor reneging on a contractual obligation
or triggering an expropriation when a country is faced with large budget deficits or immediate
resource needs. 126 However, these actions could have long-term adverse effects on a country’s
ability to attract capital.
Schools of scholarship often reflect particular ideological predispositions and accordingly
tend to focus on biases in particular institutions. For example, public choice approaches focus on
minoritarian bias in political processes, assessing the power of the few to shape decision-making,
resulting in discrimination and regulatory capture. 127 Scholars working in this vein often favor the
use of market processes to avoid these biases (think, for instance, of much of the scholarship in
international trade law). A comparative institutional analysis reveals, however, that market
processes also may be skewed because most affected actors are dormant, disorganized,
uninformed, or misled. Indeed, were markets to function effectively, competition for investment
capital could discipline governmental decision-makers, obviating the need for international
investment law in the first instance.
Rights claims can trigger judicial intervention against regulatory decision-making to
protect minoritarian interests against majorities. Such intervention may involve a single investor
with high per capita stakes on one side and large groups with low per capita stakes on the other.
Where they overcome collective action problems, these groups can press officials to impose high
costs on sunk investments through ex post regulations or expansive interpretations of existing ones.
Investors may have been in a powerful position in drafting contracts and lobbying for regulations
ex ante because of their higher per capita stakes compared to the general public, which faced
significant information and organizational costs regarding a proposed project. The project’s
opponents, however, can become more powerful ex post after the investment was made and its
ensuing costs became apparent.
Judicial processes can help correct for majoritarian biases by offering the advantage of
evenhandedness and legal reasoning—hallmarks of the rule of law. Yet, courts too are subject to
limitations and other biases. Judicial processes are expensive to use on a case-by-case basis, thus
favoring parties with financial means and high per capita stakes. Judicial processes may thus favor
investors who hire sophisticated lawyers to shape the interpretation of open-ended provisions and
125
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126
The two most common ISDS claims are violations of “fair and equitable treatment” (including specific
commitments made to investors that creates “justified expectations”) and expropriations (particularly indirect
expropriations, as in the Argentine cases, but also direct ones, as in the Venezuela cases). See Stone Sweet et al, supra
note 63.
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create favorable legal doctrines over time. In this way, the “haves” may come out ahead in
adjudication. 128 Judicial processes, moreover, have limited resources to handle the range of social
conflicts. In short, they involve high access costs and limits of scale given the mass of decisions
affecting investments. Judicial processes, moreover, can be remote from the public so that they
may be less able to integrate information and balance competing concerns than political processes.
International courts particularly face information costs regarding domestic concerns, potentially
giving rise to different forms of bias. 129 Much criticism of ISDS, for example, contends that large
multinational corporations, allied with the arbitration bar, bring aggressive claims to chill
regulation that would otherwise serve the public interest. 130 In addition, institutional mechanisms
vary in their cost effectiveness in resolving disputes, which needs to be assessed.
Since all institutional processes are imperfect, they are generally distrusted; but they are
distrusted in different ways. The creation of investment rights implies distrust of national
government, as well as markets. BITs imply a distrust of domestic law. The turn to ISDS implies
distrust of domestic courts. The use of balancing tests by ISDS tribunals implies a distrust of
political processes and markets. In turn, the proposal for a multilateral investment court system
implies distrust of ISDS. This parade of institutional distrust is not surprising, since each
institutional alternative is imperfect. For any meaningful policy analysis, however, their
imperfections need to be compared and contrasted.
Whatever the goals, and however they are characterized, comparative institutional analysis
is required because institutional processes mediate the pursuit of such goals. As Komesar writes,
“it is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal and public policy results.” 131 In
weighing different institutional alternatives, the issue of participation, shaped by numbers and per
capita stakes, is always central. Biases exist in all institutions, but they differ in degree and kind.
Only after comparative institutional analysis should choices be made.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND INVESTMENT LAW
An analysis of institutional alternatives for handling unfair treatment and expropriation of
foreign direct investments should include not only the range of plausible adjudicatory options, but
also non-adjudicatory mechanisms. We apply comparative institutional analysis to assess six types
of such options: (1) market mechanisms; (2) political mechanisms; (3) domestic dispute settlement
mechanisms; (4) independent interstate adjudicatory mechanisms; (5) international adjudicatory
Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Social Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95 (1974).
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mechanisms as substitutes for domestic adjudication; and (6) international adjudicatory
mechanisms as complements of domestic adjudication. We explain the trade-offs of each of these
institutional alternatives in relation to the goals of investment law, on the one hand, and in light of
biases of participation in decision-making, on the other.
Market Mechanisms
Reputation, Contract, and Insurance
The relative superiority of adjudication in relation to market mechanisms to ensure just
treatment of foreign investors is not immediately evident, especially once one takes into account
the economic, political, and social costs of litigation. These costs are particularly salient when
companies can deploy the threat of international arbitration under BITs to “chill” regulatory
initiatives. In such cases, to borrow from Brian Tamanaha, we risk seeing “the rule of some groups
over others by and through the law,” more than a “rule of law that furthers the common good.”132
In the discussion that follows, we address the trade-offs of three market mechanisms—reputation,
contract, and political risk insurance—in light of the goals of investment law and the different
biases of these mechanisms.
The first market mechanism, reputation, is straightforward. Most States prefer to attract
investment at a lower cost. Thus, if a State develops a reputation of high risk for foreign direct
investment, investors will require a higher rate of return or will simply forego investing in the
State. The market for capital investment thus creates pressure on States to treat foreign direct
investment fairly. Indeed, states can, and at times do, enact foreign investment legislation through
which they commit to use ISDS in limited ways; in this context, State governments are freer to
tailor commitments to their view of State needs than when negotiating a BIT. 133
The market alone, however, may not induce countries to treat investment fairly. State
officials may not consider reputational effects, or the countries’ approach towards foreign direct
investment may change. Tomz shows that investors respond to the reputation of the government
in power, and not of the State itself. 134 The possibility of significant political change can thus make
the assessment of reputation fragile, leading to a short-term focus.
Second, investors can bargain with governments on a case-by-case basis and negotiate
investment protections by contract, such as with a State-controlled enterprise. In these contracts,
the parties may refer disputes to domestic courts, foreign courts, or international arbitration and
specify the applicability of domestic, foreign, or international law. 135 Brazil, for example, has
132
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never adopted a BIT with ISDS, but it is among the world’s largest recipients of foreign direct
investment—in part because investors are able to obtain protection through contracts that provide
for arbitration. 136 As Howse explains, “[a] contractual solution may be superior in many instances
as the host State can target the protection to investors that it desires to attract.” 137
Existing data shows that resource-intensive sectors that require large up-front capital
investments are frequent users of ISDS. 138 Over half of all ISDS cases relate to oil, gas, and mining
(25%), energy production (17%), or water, sanitation, and construction (12%)—sectors that
require large capital investments. 139 The irony is that it is precisely in these sectors, comprised of
sophisticated multinational companies, where investors are relatively better positioned to resolve
the “hold-up” risk through contract (which can provide, inter alia, for international arbitration),
instead of relying on broad treaty protections with ISDS. These investors of course prefer the
addition of ISDS—which creates a baseline of protection that includes an international remedy
from which they can engage in further contracting—but the question is whether ISDS is necessary
for them, especially in light of the problems with ISDS discussed below.
Third, because economic actors may be unable to ‘self-insure’ efficiently, including by
hedging against risks through diversifying, planning, or contracting, they may turn to the insurance
market to reduce non-commercial risk. A market for political risk insurance can protect foreign
investors, including against unfair, discriminatory, or expropriatory treatment. 140 Insurance is
often provided by governmental and international bodies (such as OPIC or MIGA). 141 These
bodies, in turn, can use political and legal mechanisms to press recalcitrant States to comply with
their commitments to investors.
There appears to be a renewed interest in returning to these market mechanisms. In the
renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, USTR
Lighthizer contended that U.S. investors should rely on political risk insurance if they are

of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
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See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES (2016),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf (ranking Brazil third for inward FDI between 1990-2015);
HOGAN LOVELLS, RISK AND RETURN – FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015) available at
https://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf?showdocument=1 (reporting survey of industry
leaders listing Brazil as among the countries where ‘rule of law’ issues can be avoided with arbitration).
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Howse, supra note 77 at 32. See also, Jason Webb Yackee. Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract
in International Investment Law 3 ASIAN JOURNAL OF WTO AND HEALTH LAW 121 (2008) (on the desirability of
contractual dispute settlement).
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68 WORLD POLITICS 413 (2016). Kobrin, supra note….]
139
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See Shihata, supra note 81 at 98–99 (describing the role of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency or MIGA in
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concerned about investment risk. 142 This assertion has particular resonance for the large investors
that bring most ISDS claims and are better positioned to purchase political risk insurance. 143
Trade-offs of Market Mechanisms
Seen from the perspective of investment law’s goals, there are trade-offs to these market
approaches. As regards fairness and the rule of law, market mechanisms such as reputation and
risk insurance permit an investor to bypass court proceedings, effectively delegating these
concerns to the market. 144 Insurance alone, however, should be less effective than adjudication in
deterring host government decisions ex ante because it focuses on replacement dollars paid by a
third party based on a past event. 145 Contracting, in contrast, permits the State and investor to
define what is fair, subject to a dispute settlement mechanism to enforce the bargain. However, if
most contracts provide for international commercial arbitration or a foreign judicial forum for
dispute settlement, then there will be fewer incentives for the State to invest in independent,
impartial, quality domestic dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover, contracts and international
commercial arbitration lack transparency, providing less assurance that public law concerns will
be fairly addressed. As for the goal of interstate conflict avoidance, it is conventionally understood
that international judicial processes are better than market approaches in constraining the
investor’s home State from getting involved when a conflict escalates. 146
Market mechanisms are typically touted on efficiency grounds. However, contracting and
insurance can be costly (because of bargaining and information costs), especially for small- and
medium-sized investors. Given relatively fixed transaction costs, small investors are less likely to
invest resources to bargain with governments for protections, including choice-of-law and dispute
settlement clauses, to shield them against the risks of mistreatment. Where investors are priced out
of or otherwise unable to obtain insurance or negotiate contracts, their investment may be deterred,
raising the State’s cost of capital. 147 Alternatively, States interested in reducing their cost of capital
may invest in domestic institutions to encourage investment, reduce risk insurance premiums, and
facilitate contract enforcement. In practice, therefore, market mechanisms may be sufficient in
many cases.
For major cross-cutting events such as civil war or economic crises affecting many or all
investments, it arguably is preferable to rely on market mechanisms such as political risk insurance
and currency and other forms of hedging, rather than ex post adjudication, so that investors take
Donnan, supra note 52. Cf. TAYLOR ST JOHN, THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: POLITICS, LAW, AND
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 217-20 (2018) (noting that ISDS was promoted initially with the understanding that it
would not promote FDI into developing countries at the expense of investments in the United States).
143
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http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf (citing OECD figures showing “48% of the
cases were brought by medium and large enterprises, varying in size from several hundred employees to tens of
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146
Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L. J. 232, 256 (1995).
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precautions and price risks accordingly. An example is the collapse of the Argentine peso, which
affected large numbers of investments in Argentina, and which arguably was a foreseeable risk
over the long term given the history of financial crises in that country. As Anne van Aaken writes
regarding one famous ISDS decision, “Although the tribunal held in its decision on jurisdiction
that ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business judgments,’…
insuring bad or at least quite imprudent business judgment is exactly the consequence of the CMS
tribunal’s decision on the merits.” 148
In terms of bias in participation and decision-making, to the extent that contract and
insurance are available only for large investors with high per capita stakes, these mechanisms can
give rise to minoritarian bias in favor of those actors in relation to smaller investors, be they foreign
or domestic. If market mechanisms fail to spur the development of domestic rule-of-law
institutions, there will be ongoing risks of majoritarian and minoritarian biases against investors.
However, these mechanisms remain important alternatives (or complements), especially for States
concerned with diminution of sovereignty from international adjudicatory mechanisms.
Political Mechanisms
Negotiation and Mediation
Conflicts over the treatment of foreign direct investment can also be resolved through
political bargaining, thus avoiding the cost of insurance or adjudication. 149 Mediation—
negotiation facilitated by a neutral third party—seems to be increasingly used in international
business generally, 150 and negotiation has been used to address many investment conflicts.151
While such negotiations and mediations often occur informally and without much transparency,
some countries are promoting more institutionalized alternatives through treaties. For example,
MERCOSUR’s Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation provides for direct State-toState negotiations (Article 24) and mediation (Article 23). 152 These procedures are based on
Anne van Aaken, On the Necessity of Necessity Measures: A Response to Alan O Sykes, AJIL UNBOUND (Dec. 23,
2015) (referring to CMS decision, Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID No. ARB/01/08, para. 368 (May 12,
2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005).
149
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Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 367 (1979) (explaining that the impetus
for ICSID included the World Bank’s role for informal mediation of disputes with foreign investors).
150
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Brazil’s model Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (“ACFI”), which the
Brazilian government has promoted as an alternative to traditional BITs. 153
Trade-offs of Political Mechanisms
Reliance on negotiation and mediation should be less likely to promote broader rule of law
practices within domestic governance institutions since conflicts would be resolved in light of
political objectives shaped by relative power. Fairness towards affected stakeholders would only
be addressed as a function of their representation by States. Negotiations might be conducted in
the shadow of the law, but references to the law might be just self-serving, cheap talk. Because of
the uncertainty of these processes, they also would less likely advance the goal of reducing the
cost of investment capital. These political options, however, could be cheaper since the parties
would avoid the high costs associated with litigation. 154 The host State could then use its resources
in other more productive ways.
Although diplomacy may work in some instances, it also can be complex, costly, and
opaque. The more difficult that it is to understand channels of influence, the costlier it is for
investors to organize for political action. Small- and medium-sized investors are likely to be
particularly disadvantaged because they have less political access to State officials—who prioritize
the deployment of State resources based on economic weight and systemic importance. 155 In
contrast, well-organized actors with substantial stakes are better positioned to trigger a response
from the home State. Thus, when this institutional option is used successfully on behalf of an
investor, it may be biased in favor of those investors with substantial stakes, reflecting minoritarian
bias. When it fails to benefit an unjustly treated investor, it could reflect majoritarian bias.
Domestic Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Courts, Specialized Processes, and Ombudsman Offices
Domestic dispute settlement mechanisms are the first (and fallback) option for resolving
investment disputes through adjudication if negotiations fail. Domestic law can delegate
investment disputes to specialized domestic courts and other institutions because of their expertise
and to counter bias against outsiders. 156 Iraq and Kazakhstan, for example, created specialized
See e.g., Brazil–Mozambique Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investment Agreement art. 15, Mar.
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.
20,
2015,
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See also United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives
to Arbitration 16–18 (2010), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf..
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investment courts to hear disputes between investors and investment authorities for these
reasons. 157 Other countries use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including (more
recently) an investment ombudsman office. 158 Morocco and South Korea mandate institutionalized
mediation before a domestic institution—respectively, the Moroccan Investment Development
Agency and the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board—prior to adjudication. 159
Domestic dispute settlement mechanisms can apply international law as part of domestic
law. Depending on the State’s constitutional system, a domestic court can apply international law
directly as part of the domestic legal system or indirectly through domestic implementing
legislation. 160 Thus, a national court or domestic authority may be able to decide the investment
dispute by reference to a treaty or customary international law.
Trade-offs of Domestic Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Using domestic mechanisms, at least as a first instance, offers comparative advantages.
First, the rule of law, broadly understood, depends on qualified, independent, impartial domestic
dispute settlement institutions that can address the claims of all affected stakeholders. An
advantage of addressing these claims together, including any counterclaims by the State or affected
individuals or communities, is that a single forum can hear them. Relatedly, a broader range of
actors have access to domestic proceedings so that more voices can be heard by decision-makers,
which promotes fairness. Since a single venue would hear the claim, the process also could be
more efficient. Domestic institutions are relatively more available to hear smaller cases that are
important to smaller investors. International investment law’s effectiveness thus is bolstered by
them, and at times depends on their hearing and resolving claims. 161 Where a critical mass of actors
uses domestic institutions to resolve investment disputes, these institutions can develop expertise
and a professional ethos and reputation. Domestic institutions with these characteristics are more
likely to be accepted as legitimate venues for resolving claims than a remote international body.
This, in turn, can facilitate enforcement and compliance.
The effective use of domestic mechanisms also can help to incentivize investment and
support economic growth, thereby reducing a country’s cost of capital. A State that wishes to
For Iraq see U.S. Department of State, 2017 Investment Climate Statements (Jun. 29, 2017),
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2017/nea/269978.htm. For Kazakhstan see Elira Kirgeyeva, It is Offered to
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States have set up institutions to provide internal mediation services or designate official mediators available for
foreign investors”).
159
For South Korea, see Françoise Nicolas et al., Lessons from Investment Policy Reform in Korea 23, 25. See also
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reduce its cost of capital thus has an incentive to invest in domestic institutions to uphold the rule
of law. In contrast, automatic resort to international dispute settlement as a substitute for domestic
mechanisms could reduce pressure to create national institutions that are independent and can hold
governments accountable. 162
The internationalization of investment disputes, however, is a response to real deficiencies
in many judicial systems and concerns over the impartiality of domestic authorities. From the
perspective of capital exporting countries, national courts in many developing countries are unable
to provide speedy, neutral, and technically competent resolution of investment claims. 163 In these
situations, investors prefer enforcement outside of local institutions to ensure fairness. Historically,
developing countries have agreed to these processes in part because of power dynamics, but also
often because they know that their domestic judicial systems can fail to provide such assurances.
Domestic mechanisms also are prone to majoritarian bias and minoritarian bias. Local
majorities can inflict high costs on investors where a single investor with high per capita stakes is
on one side, and, on the other side, are large groups with low per capita stakes. Domestic
authorities may not be able to withstand pressure to adopt popular decisions at the investor’s
expense. At other times, domestic minoritarian interests may convince local authorities to take
discriminatory action against a foreign investor. On the other hand, although one always can find
examples of minoritarian bias, many studies find that foreign firms, on average, are treated at least
the same or even better than domestic firms, such that the alternative of ISDS provides them with
an even greater advantage. 164 The choice of this option thus depends on context and, once again,
its comparison with other institutional alternatives.
Independent Interstate Adjudicatory Mechanisms
In the investment context, a State can be sued before an international court or tribunal with
jurisdiction when another State asserts diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. In
espousing an investor’s claim, the State operates independently of the investor, which has no direct
control over the claim, unlike the other adjudicatory mechanisms we assess. Interstate adjudication
of investment disputes generally does not result from acceptance of an international court’s
jurisdiction before a dispute arises. Rather, States more commonly make arrangements after the
conduct at issue occurs by creating ad hoc tribunals or consenting to jurisdiction for a specific
case. Nonetheless, permanent bodies such as the ICJ or the WTO have heard some investmentrelated complaints.
Ad Hoc Tribunals
States have periodically created international claims commissions and ad hoc arbitral
tribunals to adjudicate cases involving the seizure and mistreatment of foreign-held property. 165 In
See infra notes… (discussing international mechanisms as substitutes).
CRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 5 (2001). (“Rightly or wrongly, the national
courts of one of the disputing parties are not perceived as sufficiently impartial.”).
164
However, a number of studies find that foreign firms tend to be treated at least the same or even better than domestic
firms see e.g., BONNITCHA ET AL, supra note 88 at pp. 149-151.
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MILES supra note 14 at 67-9 (noting examples of mixed claims commissions including those established to handle
disputes between France–Venezuela, Iran–United States, United States–Germany, Mexico–United States, and Iran–
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many of these instances, States established a semi-permanent body where only States have
standing and control the selection of arbitrators. Some of these tribunals have been created
following mediation or peace agreements involving diplomatic efforts and sometimes coercion.
The best known example of interstate ad hoc adjudication of investment disputes because of its
duration and number of awards is the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The tribunal was created pursuant
to the Algiers Accords after Iran seized U.S. embassy officials as hostages and nationalized the
assets of U.S. companies, and the United States, in turn, froze around US$11 billion of Iranian
assets held in U.S. banks. 166 During the 1980s and 1990s, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal created a
huge body of investment law jurisprudence that laid important groundwork for ISDS case law. 167
The U.S. and Europe have generally stopped espousing investor claims, and, with ISDS,
they have little reason to do so. 168 The United Kingdom, for example, wound up its Foreign
Compensation Commission, sending a general message that its investors are on their own (i.e.,
should rely on BITs) to resolve disputes. 169 The United States still espouses investor claims, but
its policy shifted so that it does not espouse a claim if the investor has other options available, such
as before local courts or ISDS. Some States, however, have recently advocated for interstate
alternatives to ISDS. 170 Brazil’s ACFI, for example, permits State-to-State adjudication and
explicitly rejects investor-State arbitration. 171 South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act of 2015
provides that the government may consent to State-to-State dispute settlement, rather than ISDS,
subject to the exhaustion of local remedies. 172
International Courts
Modern BITs have antecedents in FCN treaties, and some of these treaties provided for
interstate dispute resolution before the ICJ. Very few cases before the ICJ, however, have involved
the treatment of foreign investment. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court found that the treaty
at issue provided limited rights for shareholders, and it set a high bar for legal standing to invoke
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State responsibility on their behalf. 173 Capital exporting countries, lobbied by multinational
corporations, thus turned to more specialized bodies to resolve investment conflicts.
In 1995, States created the WTO, the multilateral trade organization with a compulsory
dispute settlement system. The WTO covers some investment-related disciplines in different
agreements. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) addresses the establishment of
a “commercial presence” in WTO Members to provide services (i.e., an investment). The
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prohibits investment measures that
favor the use of domestic products over foreign ones, such as through domestic content regulations.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) prescribes rules
protecting patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual property. Some WTO members
have continued to advocate for additional coverage of investment issues. 174 Any WTO member
can activate the WTO system of interstate adjudication, which does not require the exhaustion of
local remedies. Its two-tier process includes an appellate body, which provides a precedent for the
EU’s proposed multilateral investment court system. Indeed, rather than creating a new
international organization with a new secretariat, an investment court could be housed at the WTO,
which some favor. 175
A few WTO disputes have involved investment-related issues, including regarding GATS,
TRIMS, and TRIPS, and a few of them were litigated in parallel to ISDS cases. 176 However,
because WTO claims are limited to the WTO covered agreements and because many countries’
commitments under the GATS are limited, WTO cases generally have not addressed the most
frequently litigated ISDS claims regarding fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. They
rather have involved claims over intellectual property and non-discrimination, especially since
BITs and ISDS panels have adopted expansive definitions of “investment.” The most noteworthy
case is Australia-Plain Tobacco Packaging where the WTO and ISDS claims were largely
analogous, based on an alleged indirect expropriation of a Philip Morris brand (under the BIT
claim) and the encumberment of the trademark (under the WTO TRIPs claim). 177 There also have
been parallel ISDS and WTO national treatment cases based on the same government measure,
with the WTO cases addressing discrimination against traded goods and the ISDS ones involving
discrimination against the foreign investor. 178 Analogously, there were both WTO and ISDS
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 ICJ REP. 3, 32 (Judgment
of Feb. 5).
174
In 2017, twelve emerging economies, including Brazil, China, Mexico, and Pakistan, created a new group in the
WTO named Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development to advance new investment-related proposals. See
World
Trade
Organization,
Trade
and
Investment
Topics,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
175
Interview with official of the European Commission, Brussels, May 16, 2018.
176
See e.g., Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R,
WT/DS142/R (adopted 19 June 2000) as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R,
DSR 2000: VII, p. 3043 (involving investment related measures under TRIMS and GATT); Australia—Certain
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WT/DS434 (Ukraine), WT/DS435 (Honduras), WT/DS441 (DR), WT/DS458 (Cuba), WT/DS467
(Indonesia) (involving IP related measures under TRIPS); United States - Measures Concerning Non-Immigrant Visas
- Request for consultations by India - WT/DS503/1/Add.1 (18 March 2016) (involving measures under GATS).
177
Cf. Australia—Certain Measures, supra note…; and Philip Morris Asia v. the Commonwealth of Australia, Philip
Morris Asia Notice of Arbitration, ¶7.15–7.17 (Nov. 21, 2012).
178
For example, American fructose producers brought three ISDS cases against Mexico in response to a Mexican tax
on soft drinks with an exemption for those using cane sugar (which came from Mexican producers), while the United
States successfully brought a WTO claim against the same discriminatory tax. The U.S.-Canada softwood lumber saga
173
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claims brought against Mexico’s telecommunications regulations that favored the Mexican quasimonopolist Telmex. 179 More generally, WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence upholding nondiscriminatory State regulation has been cited and arguably influenced ISDS cases regarding the
need for balance in recognizing a State’s right to regulate. 180
Trade-offs of Independent Interstate Adjudicatory Mechanisms
These two types of interstate options—ad hoc tribunals and permanent courts—present
similar trade-offs, but they also exhibit some important differences. Both permanent and ad hoc
bodies can provide some support for adherence to the rule of law, and thus provide some assurance
of fair treatment of investors. However, a permanent international court hearing investment claims
offers certain advantages over ad hoc dispute settlement. First, it can create greater certainty that
claims may be brought, since no further negotiations are needed to create the tribunal. Second, a
multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, as under the WTO, can cover the major nations of the
world, operate iteratively over time in clarifying and enforcing legal commitments, and thus have
more normative authority than ad hoc bodies. 181 This is particularly the case of an international
mechanism with an appeals system, such as the WTO Appellate Body, which has generated a
substantial and influential jurisprudence, including regarding a State’s right to regulate. 182 As a
result, permanent interstate bodies could better facilitate the diffusion of norms of fairness, helping
to enhance rule-of-law accountability in domestic jurisdictions.
Interstate adjudicatory mechanisms offer both benefits and raise concerns because of State
control of the process. On the one hand, States may represent the broader interests of their citizens,
as opposed to only investor commercial interests. Because interstate alternatives constrain access
to dispute settlement, they create an opportunity for States to screen controversial, overlyaggressive, or illegitimate claims. 183 Moreover, this alternative permits States to control the
arguments brought before tribunals regarding the interpretation of the treaty they negotiated. This
power is important, since in many instances States could be on either side of investment claims—
as a defendant or as a complainant espousing a national’s claims. Having States act as filters can
be beneficial because it eliminates corporate actors’ ability to aggressively pursue adjudication
also included parallel ISDS and WTO claims for violation of national treatment clauses. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost
Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin? 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49-50 (2008) (on the sweeteners and lumber disputes).
179
See Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/3 (Feb. 18, 2002); and Notice of
Intent, Telefónica S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/4 available
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1040.pdf.
180
See e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 87
(Sept. 5, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf. See generally, Greg Tereposky &
Morgan Maguire, Utilizing WTO Law in Investor State Dispute Settlement, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 247 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2011).
181
See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate
Body, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 271 (2016).
182
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by the Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 9 (2016).
183
For example, the case brought by Ely Lilly challenging a Canadian Supreme Court’s decision regarding the criteria
of patentability, and the case brought by Philip Morris against Uruguayan regulatory measures advocated by the World
Health Organization have been hugely controversial. See Eli Lilly and Co. v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2 Final Award (16 March 2017); and FTR Holding S.A., Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) & Abal
Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (2010), Award (Jul. 8, 2016).
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through ISDS—whether to bargain in the law’s shadow, counter prospective regulation through
the threat of an expensive lawsuit, or to shape the law’s interpretation—and can thus be relatively
less biased against States and the other stakeholder interests that States represent. Because States
retain control of dispute settlement, they can focus on long-term mutual gains, rather than shortterm victories in investment disputes.
On the other hand, because the system is State-based, it retains a political/diplomatic
dimension and thus does not focus directly on the fair treatment of private parties, nor on enhancing
the rule of law in domestic jurisdictions. States may sacrifice a private party’s interests and decide
not to bring a claim. 184 In addition, States control the selection of judges, so that the judges in these
bodies may have only moderate independence. 185 Moreover, remedies issued by interstate bodies
may not benefit the harmed investor. The primary WTO remedy, for example, is the withdrawal
of equivalent concessions by the complaining State, which provides no compensation to the
aggrieved private party. 186 In consequence, investors could be warier about investing in the State
in question, potentially increasing that State’s cost of capital. Finally, in terms of international
relations, this mechanism may be less likely to depoliticize a conflict since the bringing of claims
by one State against another could be viewed as an unfriendly, political act, at least more so than
when an investor brings the claims on its own. 187
In terms of participation and bias, because States exercise discretion as to whether to
espouse a claim, participation will more likely be skewed in favor of well-connected private
parties. States may only espouse claims of nationals that are politically influential and vociferously
lobby them. They may only represent claims of large companies, so that small- and medium-sized
companies’ claims are sacrificed in the interest of interstate relations, and hence result in
minoritarian bias. International adjudicatory bodies (whether permanent or ad hoc) also could
exhibit bias in favor of powerful States, such as to ensure their support for the overall system so
that it does not collapse. 188 Yet, once again, the benefits and deficiencies of this alternative must
be assessed against those besetting other decision-making processes in light of particular State
contexts.
Stephan Schill, Enhancing the Legitimacy of International Investment Law: Conceptual and Methodological
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 68 (2011) (“While this solution would allow states
to exclude spurious or frivolous claims, it would equally permit them to discard claims for foreign policy reasons”);
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 277–78 (6th ed., 1963) (arguing that State-to-State procedure “is far from
satisfactory from the individual’s point of view. He has no remedy of his own, and the state to which he belongs may
be unwilling to take up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits”).
185
Cf. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(judges are “independent” when they are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and serve fixed terms); and
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (discussing political constraints that operate on international courts and
tribunals.)
186
See Sykes, supra note 71 at 643.
187
See e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438, 454 (1947), reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 487, 504 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1975)
(arguing that the espousal of a claim by the state tends to impart the complexion of political controversy and unfriendly
action).
188
See e.g., Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 74
(2006) (“state behavior and associated international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law, but
because international law mirrors the interests of powerful states, international law is merely an epiphenomenon of
underlying power”).
184
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International Adjudicatory Mechanisms as Substitutes
The proliferation of ISDS cases and large damage awards has catalyzed debates over
institutional reform, notably over whether to create a multilateral investment court system.
Although both ISDS and such a system could operate as complements to domestic mechanisms,
we address the two options as substitutes because that is how they have been proposed and
operated. 189
Ad hoc Tribunals—ISDS
ISDS is the dominant method for international investment adjudication today. Thousands
of BITs provide for it, as do many free trade agreements such as NAFTA. ISDS is a mechanism
through which investors may directly obtain damages from States for breaches of international
investment law by bringing claims to an arbitral panel. 190 ICSID provides the main pillar for ISDS,
although approximately 39% of proceedings take place outside of ICSID, such as through the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and other
bodies. 191 Individual arbitrations have produced awards of over a billion dollars, and numerous
awards are in the hundreds of millions.192 The awards are binding on the parties and not subject to
appeal or to any other checks except on very limited grounds. 193
Trade-offs of ISDS
ISDS offers many institutional advantages, especially for investors. Compared to domestic
mechanisms, ISDS guarantees foreign investors access to a specialized adjudicatory process that
is independent of national authorities. It provides an alternative where domestic systems lack
reliable, quality, impartial courts. Compared to the interstate alternative, the investor has a private
right of action and does not depend on the State to espouse its claim. It is thus viewed as a more
See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (2005) (concluding that in many cases BITs with ISDS operate as
substitutes, rather than compliments, of local institutions); Center for International Environmental Law, Position
Paper: EU Proposal for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute Resolution, March 15, 2017 at p. 5 (criticizing
the proposal for “allowing investors to side step” domestic courts).
190
ICSID arbitration tribunals are typically composed of three members. Both the investor and the State select one
arbitrator and they jointly agree on a third arbitrator as chair, failing which the chair is selected by the President of the
World Bank (or, in some instances, the co-arbitrators). ICSID Convention, supra note 24 at arts. 37-38. In practice,
the Secretary-General of ICSID recommends a Chair to the World Bank President.
191
UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures
(UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7)
Nov.
7
2017
available
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf.
192
Id. (noting that between 1987-2017, “in cases decided in favour of the investor, the average amount claimed was
$1.35 billion and the median $113 million. The average amount awarded was $522 million and the median $19
million.”)
193
ICSID Convention, supra note 24 at art 52 (providing for annulment of an award on five limited grounds). ICSID’s
Additional Facility (AF), which can be used by non-ICSID members, does not grant arbitration awards the benefit of
ICSID annulment procedures. See ICSID, ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, ICSID DOC. ICSID/11 (2006). In the latter
case, ICSID awards are subject to review by national courts. However, the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards limits the scope of national court review if the State is a party to that
convention.
189

35
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639

legal and less political process than interstate dispute settlement. 194 Accordingly, ISDS should be
more attractive to investors, although the investor must cover its share of the cost of arbitration.
To the extent that ISDS provides greater assurances to investors that they will be fairly
treated in accordance with basic rule-of-law protections, then ISDS could help States to attract
investment, thus contributing to resource allocation efficiency and aggregate national welfare. In
addition, from the perspective of interstate relations, ISDS compartmentalizes conflicts between
States by providing investors with legal standing to bring claims. To some, it thus appears superior
from the perspective of interstate conflict avoidance. 195
ISDS is also subject to disadvantages in terms of investment law’s goals. From the
perspective of fairness, many contend that ISDS is biased in favor of investors. 196 From the
perspective of the rule of law, since ISDS decisions are made on an ad hoc basis and are not subject
to appeal, they have resulted in many inconsistencies and contradictions, such that like cases are
not decided alike. 197 From the perspective of resource allocation efficiency, since countries balance
investment promotion against other social welfare goals, if ISDS is biased against other State social
welfare policies, then any additional investment is not optimal. 198 Moreover, ISDS jurisprudence
generated by investor claims, has created considerable uncertainty, both because of its
inconsistencies and because it frequently calls into question contractual commitments that are
overridden by BIT claims. 199 In addition, empirical studies question whether BITs with ISDS, in
fact, leads to greater foreign direct investment. 200 From the perspective of depoliticization,
investors at times bring claims that implicate highly sensitive domestic policies, thus increasing
conflict and political tension.
Perhaps most importantly, the rule of law ultimately depends on domestic governance, but
ISDS has operated as a substitute for local courts. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention does not
require “exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies” “unless otherwise stated” in a
treaty, and in practice most BITs do not require it. 201 Indeed, for years ICSID highlighted the
importance of abstention from domestic courts as “essential to the proper implementation” of
ISDS. 202 In fact, many BITs contain a fork-in-the-road provision that makes the use of local courts

194
Reisman Opinion, supra note 29 at 20-1 (noting ISDS as removing “the caprice of sovereign-to-sovereign
politics”).
195
Roberts, Triangular Treaties, supra note 73 at 378-80.
196
See supra note… [citing Schneiderman and Sonarajah].
197
See supra note… Cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 34, at 220 (‘[t]he more the judicial model has been
institutionalized, the more inconsistent decisions are treated as signatures of (treatable) pathology”); Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes, Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals the Threads of a Managerial Approach'
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 46 (2017) (explaining how procedural mechanisms are being used to a greater extent to mitigate
inconsistencies).
198
See supra note…
199
See Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 351
(2016) (“arbitral jurisprudence has varied wildly on this point, creating significant problems of certainty, efficiency,
and fairness—for states and foreign investors alike”).
200
UNCTAD, The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of
Empirical Studies 1998–2014, Sept. 2014 (reviewing 35 published and unpublished studies).
201
ICSID Convention, supra note 24 art. 26. For practice, see Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 20 at 268.
202
See Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 784 (1983); B. P. Marchais, ICSID
and the Courts, NEWS OF ICSID 4 (Summer 1986).
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“fatal to any attempt to use the BIT’s investor-to-state disputes procedure.” 203 Where ISDS
discourages a relationship of complementarity with domestic courts, it can reduce the pressure for
domestic rule-of-law reforms. 204 It thus tends to promote exit (from domestic legal systems) over
voice (in domestic law reform debates). 205
In terms of participation and bias, adjudication can offer the advantage of evenhandedness
and legal reasoning to counter potential majoritarian bias against investors. ISDS, however,
involves high access costs, is removed from mass publics, and is commonly charged with failure
to appropriately balance competing interests, in part because of the inability of States and other
stakeholders to raise claims and counterclaims against investors. 206 Moreover, unlike judges,
arbitrators in ISDS are nominated by the parties. This selection process may shape their
dispositions, reflecting different forms of bias—categorized as selection, compensation, and
affiliation bias. 207 Some arbitrators represent and consult for private clients in their legal practice,
and thus may face conflicts of interest. 208 Structurally, since the ISDS system is highly
remunerative for private practitioners, and since the arbitrators are paid on a case-by-case basis
(and by the hour), the arbitrators have an incentive to ensure the future flow of claims. ISDS thus
can lead to minoritarian bias in favor of investors, especially those that are well-organized, because
they have high per capita stakes, compared to other stakeholders that are numerous but
disorganized due to their low per-capita stakes.
International Courts—Multilateral Investment Court System
Because of the criticisms of ISDS, the EU and many commentators have advocated for the
creation of a specialized multilateral investment court system containing an appellate body. What
the EU proposal and ISDS have in common is a private right of standing to bring international
claims directly against States. 209 They differ in their form—mainly, ad hoc arbitration versus a

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201,
258 (1988) 441-2 (explaining that fork-in-the-road require an investor to choose to submit a claim either before
domestic courts or international arbitration).
204
See e.g. Anne van Aaken, The Interaction of Remedies between National Juridical Systems and ICSID: An
Optimization Problem, in THE FUTURE OF ICSID AND THE PLACE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
EDS, N. JANSEN CALAMITA, DAVID EARNEST & MARKUS BURGSTALLER 291, 324 (2013) (“This deprives the State of
the opportunity to reconsider its decision through administrative or judicial review and grant primary remedies. A
better solution would be to allow for review of a government measure under domestic law without construing such a
challenge as a violation of the BIT protections”).
205
A. O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES (1970).
206
There are exceptions and ISDS respondents bring counterclaims, but they are typically unsuccessful; see e.g.,
Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Environmental Counterclaim, ¶ 447 (Aug.
11, 2015), IIC 699 (2015). For an extensive discussion, see, Frederic Gilles Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (2017).
207
Puig supra note 41 (discussing biases in ISDS). See also, Sergio Puig and Anton Strezhnev, Affiliation Bias in
Arbitration: An Experimental Approach, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (2017) (providing evidence of bias).
208
Langford et. al, The Revolving Door, supra note… (providing empirical evidence of double-hating); Nassib G.
Ziadé, How Many Hats Can a Player Wear: Arbitrator, Counsel and Expert?, 24 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J. 49
(2009).
209
See e.g., Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 1 March 2018. See also, European Commission,
203
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two-tier system with a standing court and appeals court. At the outset, it is important to note that
if a multilateral international court system is created, as through the UNCITRAL process, it could
potentially depart from the EU proposed model in significant ways. 210 Analysis should thus
include how the EU proposal may be adapted. 211
The EU proposal is not the first for a permanent investment court. 212 Notably, the 1974
Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes between Host States of Arab Investments
and Nationals of Other Arab States created the Arab Court of Investment, which is now active. 213
Unlike this regional system, however, the system pursued by the EU bilaterally and multilaterally
has the potential to extend beyond a discrete geographical region and be widely used.
The EU is incrementally creating a base for such a system through signing bilateral
agreements, such as with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam, 214 while the EU continues to
promote the multilateral investment court system in parallel. These agreements are pending
ratification by each of the EU Member States, which will take time, and Belgium has requested
the CJEU to issue an opinion regarding the compatibility with EU law of CETA’s provisions
regarding an investment court system. 215 Under these agreements, claims are to be heard by threemember divisions of a permanent court, which would replace the system of party appointments.216
The court’s decision is subject to appeal before a tribunal comprised of six members who must
“have demonstrated expertise in public international law.” 217 The grounds for appeal include errors
of law and manifest errors of fact, in addition to the grounds provided in Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention. 218 The appeal tribunal would have the power to “modify or reverse” the panel’s
decision or remand it for further consideration. The contracting States would select the members
of the court and appeal tribunal, who would be paid a regular salary, enjoy security of tenure for a
fixed, non-renewable term (around four to five years), and be subject to a set of ethical obligations
Reading Guide, European Commission Fact Sheet – Reading Guide (Sept. 16, 2015) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-15-5652_en.pdf.
210
Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
211
Id.
212
Taylor St. John and Yulia Chernykh, Déjà vu? Investment Court Proposals from 1960 and Today, EJIL: TALK!
May 15, 2018 https://www.ejiltalk.org/deja-vu-investment-court-proposals-from-1960-and-today/ (explaining that
“in the 1950s and 1960s, eminent international lawyers from around the world … discussed an international investment
court, notably at International Law Association conferences”).
213
The Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between Host States of Arab Investments and Nationals
of Other Arab States, Jun. 10, 1974, reproduced in French in 1981 Rev. Arb. 348; and Unified Agreement for the
Investment
of
Arab
Capital
in
the
Arab
States,
Nov.
26,
1980,
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/36%20volume%202.pdf. See also Walid Ben Hamida, The
Development of the Arab Investment Court's Case Law: New Decisions Rendered by the Arab Investment Court, 6
INT’L J. ARAB ARB. 12 (2014).
214
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
215
See infra note…
216
The divisions would be composed of members randomly selected from the Tribunal, consisting of a roster with
fixed term appointments created by the treaty parties. At least for a transitional period, the Tribunal members would
be paid a monthly retainer complemented by the scheduled ICSID hourly fees when they serve on a Tribunal, and
they would not be barred from working on arbitration cases. After the transitional period, they are to be paid a salary
and hired on a full-time basis. See Negotiating Directives supra note 204. Until the system becomes fully
operationalized, the proposed Tribunal would retain a number of ISDS characteristics, raising questions regarding the
extent of its differentiation from ISDS. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner supra note 54.
217
See e.g., CETA, supra note 27, art 8.27(4).
218
Id., art 8.28.

38
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639

to ensure independence and impartiality. 219 If the multilateral investment court system draws from
this model, many further procedural details remain to be determined by the parties that choose to
join it. The EU’s treaties, such as CETA, commit the parties to apply a multilateral mechanism
once established. 220
Trade-offs of the Multilateral Investment Court System
As regards fairness, some commentators contend that a multilateral investment court
system would be less fair for investors because States would control the nomination of judges and
thus the judges would favor States. 221 Other commentators object to the notion that fairness
requires allowing private parties to choose their own judges when suing States, given the broader
public policy interests are at stake. 222 Arguably, when selecting permanent judges ex ante rather
than ad hoc arbitrators ex post, treaty parties have a greater incentive to internalize their interests
as capital-importers and -exporters and thus pick balanced judges, rather than pro-state or proinvestor ones, who are committed to upholding the treaty parties’ agreement. 223 For many skeptics
of ISDS, a court should be better positioned to balance investor rights against other public policy
goals, as reflected in the principle of a State’s right to regulate. In addition, a court with an appellate
mechanism is more likely to treat like cases alike, so that investors’ claims will be treated more
consistently (especially where the text of the applicable legal instruments is the same).
The proposed multilateral investment court system also provides greater opportunities than
ISDS for repeat interaction with national courts. These interactions are more likely to give rise to
a common understanding of legal obligations. If that occurs, then the court may be better
positioned to advance rule-of-law norms within domestic governance. Nonetheless, since the
proposed system is structured as a substitute for domestic courts (subject to reservations), it also
is less likely than complementary mechanisms to place pressure on national governments to ensure
the independence, impartiality, and quality of their domestic dispute settlement systems. 224
Commentators also contend that a multilateral court system would be less biased than ISDS
in favor of major powers, and in particular the United States. Gus Van Harten, for example, notes
that under ICSID, the authority to appoint arbitrators that the parties do not designate, such as the
chair of the tribunal, is vested in an official who is close to the U.S. government. 225 The Convention
empowers the Chairman of ICSID’s Administrative Council (i.e., the President of the World Bank,
who always has been a U.S. national) to select from among a roster of arbitrators the remaining
Id., art 8.30(1).
See e.g. CETA supra note 47 art 8.29 (“Upon establishment of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint
Committee shall adopt a decision providing that investment disputes under this Section will be decided pursuant to
the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional arrangements”).
221
See Schwebel, supra note 54.
222
See Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court (SOC’Y OF INT’L ECON. L. INAUGURAL CONF.,
Working
Paper
No.
22/08,
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com
/abstract
= 1153424
and
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153424.
223
Anthea Roberts, Would a Multilateral Investment Court be Biased? Shifting to a treaty party framework of analysis,
EJIL TALK! April 28, 2017.
224
This feature, however, might be reconsidered if a multilateral convention were to be negotiated following
developments in the UNCITRAL working group. See Roberts, supra note 1 at […].
225
Gus Van Harten supra note 225 at […]. ICSID only appoints arbitrators when the parties themselves appoint them
or when the parties have not agreed on the Chair or another means to select the Chair, such as by the other two
arbitrators.
219
220
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arbitrator(s). In practice, this function is performed on the recommendation of ICSID’s SecretaryGeneral whom a former Secretary-General of ICSID has accused of “paying heed” to the United
States and other rich countries. 226 Interestingly, the United States has never lost an ISDS case. 227
From the perspective of resource allocation efficiency, if a permanent court is more
deferential toward States because States appoint the judges, then, in theory, investors could be
warier of investing, raising a State’s cost of capital. Yet, for investment protection to be optimal,
States should balance foreign investment with other social welfare goals, and tribunals should not
privilege investor protection over those goals. Moreover, there is little reason to believe, and no
empirical evidence to substantiate, that rational investors would be less likely to invest under a
multilateral investment court system rather than ISDS—although the court could face backlog
problems since it cannot expand the number of panels in response to a large number of new claims
as the ISDS regime. In addition, although maintaining a permanent court has costs, ISDS may be
just as expensive, especially since annulment proceedings are frequently used. Thus, institutional
costs should be given limited weight in deciding between them (especially if the costs can be
transferred partially to the disputing parties), although they could be a factor in relation to other
alternatives. 228
The proposed multilateral investment court system should have similar, although
potentially not as robust, positive effects as ISDS on depoliticizing disputes. Permitting investors
to take disputes directly could depoliticize them as compared to having them resolved through
diplomatic confrontation. Yet, because States control the appointment of the judges, the process
could become politicized, as seen in the crisis besetting the WTO’s Appellate Body. 229 Members
of the international investment law community fear a similar attack on an investment court.
In terms of bias, depending on implementation details regarding the cost of access,
transparency, and the process of nominating adjudicators, the proposed multilateral investment
court system could better balance investors’ legitimate expectations against State regulatory goals.
See, Douglas Thomson, Is ICSID a “Monarchy”?, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (2016) (citing Nassib Ziade, former
Secretary-General of ICSID). Both the President of the Bank and the Secretary-General of ICSID have routinely been
accused of bias in the practice of appointments. See Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rules
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J, 55 (2007).
227
In one infamous case, commentators broadly view the result as a function of political pressure. See e.g., Jan
Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein
Distinguished Scholar Chair at the Miami University School of Law 11 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at www.arbitrationicca.org/media/4/69377396990603/media012773749999020
paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf, at 6 (citing a conference recording where the arbitrator admitted he “had met with
officials of the U.S. Department of Justice prior to accepting the appointment, and that they had told him: ‘You know,
judge, if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA’. He remembered his answer as having been ‘Well, if you want to
put pressure on me, then that does it’).
228
See European Commission, State of the Union 2017: A Multilateral Investment Court available
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf (“The interested parties would need to
negotiate the budget and financing of the multilateral investment court. Like all other international organizations, the
contracting parties would in principle finance the court. Its costs would depend on: the number of employed judges;
the size of the secretariat; the number of contracting parties”).
229
Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Mark Pollack, Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth war on trade
may be even more important, WASH. POST (Sep. 27, 2017). See also Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R.
Helfer, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 293 (2016) (on the Zimbabwe government’s blocking of the Tribunal for the South African Development
Community after a decision against it); and Dapo Akande, ICJ Elections 2017: UN General Assembly and Security
Council Elect Four Judges to the ICJ But fail to Agree on a Fifth, yet again! + Trivia Question, EJIL: TALK! (Nov.
11, 2017).
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It thus has the potential to correct some of the minoritarian biases associated with ISDS while also
helping to counter majoritarian biases in domestic decision-making. Nonetheless, use of a
permanent court would remain expensive, thus favoring those with high per capita stakes, such as
large investors. If such potential bias raises concerns, the question remains: compared to what?
International Adjudicatory Mechanisms as Complements
A final adjudicative alternative is a system of complementarity under which domestic and
international dispute settlement processes are linked. This alternative prioritizes the use and
development of domestic institutions (courts or otherwise), which are first given the opportunity
to decide the matter. An international adjudicatory body acts as a backdrop, which, depending on
how the process is structured, potentially overrules, takes account, or provides guidance for the
domestic determinations.
There are multiple ways to design complementary processes. We present three examples
of existing international mechanisms that could motivate experimentation: (i) direct review of
domestic administrative or judicial decisions by an international panel, as reflected in NAFTA
Chapter 19; (ii) independent review of compliance with international law commitments after the
exhaustion of domestic judicial procedures, as before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR); and (iii) referrals by national courts to an international court, as under the preliminary
reference procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). We then briefly note
other variants that could be considered, such as abstention and certification, which are used in
other contexts, including some federal jurisdictions.
International Review of Domestic Decisions
One option involving complementarity is to provide for domestic decision-making up to a
certain stage, subject to review by an international adjudicatory body. NAFTA review of
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions by national administrative bodies provides an
example. Chapter 19 of the trade agreement provides that the State of nationality of the foreign
exporter may, or upon the exporter’s request shall, request the establishment of a binational panel
to review the final determination issued by the relevant authority of the NAFTA party. 230 The
binational panel, composed of five members from the two countries involved, can affirm, overrule,
or remand agency determinations. The decisions are binding within the domestic jurisdiction and
cannot be appealed to domestic courts. The process is complemented by an extraordinary challenge
procedure where a NAFTA party can challenge a binational panel ruling on limited grounds, such
as for manifestly exceeding its powers. 231
Under NAFTA Chapter 19, each party applies its domestic law, which it is free to amend
at any time provided that its domestic law complies with WTO rules. 232 WTO law, in turn, is
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, at art. 1904.5. See also David A. Gantz,
Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process
to Mexico, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 297, 298 (1998).
231
NAFTA, supra note 226, at art. 1904.13. The challenge is before a committee of three members from the three
countries chosen from a 15-person roster. See NAFTA Annex 1904.13. Id. at art. 1902.2 (providing amendments to
domestic law must comply with the GATT and antidumping and subsidy codes and any “successor agreement”).
232
Id. at arts. 1902.2 (providing amendments to domestic law must comply with the GATT and antidumping and
subsidy codes and any “successor agreement”).
230
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enforced through interstate dispute settlement, which helps to clarify the meaning of the
provisions. 233 The binational panel’s determination focuses exclusively on the correct application
of the law by the domestic authority conducting the investigation, creating an international check
on the domestic decision-making process. As a result, binational panels replace judicial review of
national administrative decisions by national courts.
In theory, parties could adapt this process to provide for first-level judicial review before a
national court, subject to appeal before an international tribunal. The ability to appeal judicial
decisions to an international panel can check bias in national decision-making, but it also raises
sovereignty concerns. Indeed, the current U.S. administration wants to terminate NAFTA Chapter
19, and others in the United States have questioned Chapter 19’s constitutionality. 234 Similarly,
Belgium has asked the CJEU to issue an opinion on the compatibility of the investment court
system under CETA with EU law, and the CJEU held in March 2018 that the provisions for ISDS
in a BIT between EU Member States are incompatible with EU law. 235 The sovereignty concerns
would become even more salient were an international body to overrule a domestic court’s
application of domestic law. Reflecting this concern, India’s new model BIT provides that arbitral
tribunals shall not have jurisdiction “to re-examine any legal issue which has been finally settled
by any judicial authority of the Host State.” 236
International Claims after Domestic Proceedings
A second option is to permit a private party to bring a claim before an international
adjudicatory body under international law, but only after exhausting domestic remedies. This
approach differs from the first in that the international adjudicator does not apply domestic law,
nor does it directly review or reverse a domestic administrative or judicial finding. Rather, the
international mechanism applies international law and commences proceedings only after
domestic law processes are completed.
The ECtHR exemplifies this approach. The court has jurisdiction to hear disputes filed by
private parties as well as States under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its
Protocols against any of the 47 members of the Council of Europe. The ECtHR has heard
investment law claims under the right to property enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the
233
For example, the U.S. lost a series of WTO cases in which countries challenged its practice of using “zeroing” to
find dumping and inflate antidumping margins. Chapter 19 binational panels subsequently held against U.S.
administrative findings that used zeroing. See e.g., Article 1904 Binational Panel Review Pursuant to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip In Coils from Mexico: Final Results of 2004/2005
Antidumping
Review,
USA-MEX-2007-1904-01
(Apr.
14,
2010), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta19/stainlessincoils-dumping-nafta19.pdf.
234
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE NAFTA
RENEGOTIATIONS p. 14 (Jul. 17, 217), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf
(listing among the objectives of the NAFTA renegotiation: “Eliminate the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism”).
Scholars have contested whether use of Chapter 19 panels is constitutional, but it so far has withstood constitutional
challenge. See e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Provisions of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299 (1992).
235
See Belgium, Opinion (Opinion 1/17) on the Compatibility of CETA Investment Court System with EU Law; and
Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V. (Case C-284/16) CJEU Mar. 6, 2018, paras. 56-60 (precluding ISDS under an
agreement between the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic because of its implications for the
effectiveness of EU law).
236
Model Indian BIT, supra note 51, at Art. 14(2)(ii).
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ECHR. 237 Most notably, the ECtHR heard a challenge relating to Russia’s nationalization of the
Yukos oil company, issuing a €1.87 billion award against Russia in 2014—the largest award in
the court’s history—although Russia has yet to pay it. 238
Article 35 of the ECHR requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a party may
initiate a claim before the court. 239 The rationale for the rule is to afford domestic authorities the
opportunity to prevent or correct an alleged international law violation. A domestic court can, in
the process, apply the international standard and internalize it as part of domestic law. When
praising the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, Louis Sohn and Richard Baxter emphasized the
benefits of putting domestic courts in the front line to oversee compliance with international law
obligations and enhance international law’s effectiveness. 240
The use of exhaustion represents a form of “subsidiarity,” a principle which favors
decision-making at the local level where possible. 241 The ECtHR complements the subsidiarity
principle with the principle of a “margin of appreciation,” under which the court grants local
decision-makers a degree of discretion in applying ECHR standards in light of local contexts and
conditions. 242 The court varies its application of the margin as a function of the sufficiency and
effectiveness of domestic procedures and remedies. 243 In doing so, it arguably provides an
incentive for domestic authorities to improve the domestic rule of law.
Interpretation at the Request of National Courts
Under a third option, domestic courts could be required to submit questions to an
international adjudicatory body concerning an issue of international law that has not been clearly
settled. The response by the international body—likely a court—is binding as a matter of law.
Unlike under the first and second complementarity options, it is the national court that ultimately
237
See generally, Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch &
Stephan Wittich eds., 2009).
238
OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment on Just Satisfaction
(2014).
239
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Number 11
and Number 14 art. 35, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194 [hereinafter ECHR]. The complainant only needs to raise the
issue implicitly before local courts, or address it in terms of substance, in which case the exhaustion rule is satisfied.
Only in very limited circumstances may an affected party be exempted from the requirement of exhausting local
remedies.
240
Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens
(1961) reprinted in RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 262
(F. V. Garcia-Amador, Louis Sohn & Richard Baxter eds., 1974) (noting how “exhaustion of local remedies” “forc[es]
the maximum number of cases involving aliens into domestic courts …, with consequent beneficial effects for the
legal protection of aliens [because of] a wider incorporation of international standards into municipal law”).
241
On subsidiarity, see, Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 6–7. On its application to investment law, see generally, René Urueña, Subsidiary
and the. Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 99100 (arguing that “the demand for subsidiarity [in ISDS] is a function of the public–private divide in investment law,”
with those focusing on the private nature of investment arbitration paying less heed to subsidiarity).
242
See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND
PROPORTIONALITY (2012); Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L
L. 545 (2014).
243
See Thomas Kleinlein, Consensus and Contestability: The ECtHR and the Combined Potential of European
Consensus and Procedural Rationality Control, 28:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 871, 872 (2017).
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resolves the dispute between the parties. The national court decides all factual issues and it applies
international law (as clarified by the international court) to the facts of the case.
The EU uses such an approach for EU law, which is part of the national law of EU Member
States. National courts may (and courts of final review must) ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling
whenever a question of EU law is raised unless the CJEU has already pronounced on an identical
matter or there is no reasonable doubt about the appropriate interpretation. 244 The EU backs this
system with a parallel procedure pursuant to which Member States or the European Commission
can challenge a State’s failure to comply with EU law. 245
Other Variants of Complementarity
The complementarity mechanisms described above could be tailored to the investment
context. For example, a treaty could require the use of local remedies for a significant period of
time before international adjudication can be triggered—such as the five-year period prescribed in
India’s new model BIT 246—and an arbitral tribunal could be granted the discretion to extend this
period where appropriate. An investment treaty also could grant private parties the right, following
the exhaustion of local remedies, to petition an international commission that is empowered to
bring investment claims on their behalf before an international court. The American Convention
on Human Rights, which contains a right to “property,” includes such a mechanism. 247
Other variants could build on domestic federal jurisdictions and private international law.
For example, an international tribunal could refer a question of domestic law that arises in an
investment dispute to a domestic court. Some jurisdictions, such as the United States, use an
analogous mechanism whereby a federal court abstains from deciding a matter where state law is
unclear until it is clarified by a state court, or refers the question to the state’s highest court (a
procedure known as “certification”). 248 Many well-known investment disputes illustrate how this
procedure could be useful. For example, in his dissent in Bilcon v. Canada, Donald McRae found
that the tribunal decided an issue under Canadian law that should have been decided by Canadian
Although a referral to the CJEU may be requested by one of the parties involved in the dispute, the decision to do
so rests with the national court. The request stays national proceedings until the CJEU issues its ruling. The ruling has
the force of res judicata, and its clarification of the law is binding on all national courts in the European Union. See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 34, May 9, 2008, O.J. (C 115) 47,
Art. 267, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uriCElex:12012E/TXT, and DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH
DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 188 (3d ed., 2014). In practice, lower EU
courts have made the bulk of preliminary references. See KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 49-51 (2001).
245
Chalmers et al., supra note 247, at 337-77.
246
Model Indian BIT, supra note 51 at Art. 14(2)(ii).
247
Private parties may petition the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which can refer their case to the
court. The court also may issue advisory opinions in response to requests from Member States or the commission
regarding the interpretation of the convention, including whether domestic laws and proposed domestic legislation are
compatible with the convention. Article 21.2 of the Convention provides for the protection of property rights. See C
Grossman, The Inter-American System and its Evolution, 2 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 49 (2010). See e.g.
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, 2007 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, at para.
127 (stating “the Court has previously held that … a State may restrict the use and enjoyment of the right to property
where the restrictions are: a) previously established by law; b) necessary; c) proportional, and d) with the aim of
achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society”).
248
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 831–35, 860–62 (7th ed. 2016) (discussing abstention and
certification).
244
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courts. 249 A similar issue arose in the Metalclad case, which involved the power of local Mexican
authorities under the Mexican constitution.250 In private international law, national courts also can
stay proceedings out of international comity while another court decides the issues, basing their
decisions on such factors as respect for the acts of foreign courts, fairness to disputants, and
efficiency. 251
Finally, one can imagine less formal means that facilitate the use of domestic dispute
settlement in the first instance. NAFTA gives investors up to three years to trigger arbitration, and
thus investors may pursue local remedies until that time.252 CETA goes further. Like NAFTA, it
establishes a three-year statute of limitations if no domestic remedies are pursued. However, if
domestic remedies are pursued, then the investor has two years to commence arbitration after they
are completed, subject to a maximum of ten years from the initial measure. 253 In each case, once
an investor initiates arbitration, it may no longer bring or continue its claims for damages before a
domestic administrative tribunal or court. In this way, investors are granted time to resolve matters
within domestic legal systems without pressure to trigger ISDS. There is some evidence that this
mechanism may lead to more reliance on domestic courts than fork-in-the-road provisions under
which an investor must exclusively use either local remedies or ISDS. 254
Trade-offs of Complementarity Mechanisms
The above examples of complementarity operate in different ways, but they uncover
common lessons. Most importantly, complementarity mechanisms prioritize the enhancement of
the rule of law within domestic jurisdictions. They recognize domestic authorities as the primary
guardians of achieving the rule of law and fairness toward investors and other constituencies, but
subject to an international accountability mechanism. In the process, they can enhance legal
certainty and uniform application of the law. By empowering domestic courts to oversee
compliance with legal obligations (which directly or indirectly reflect international law ones),

Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov't of Can., Case No. 2009-04, 9 51 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) (McRae, dissenting),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/Dissenting%200pinion%20of%20Professor%20Donald%20McRae956b.pdf?fil-id=2905
paras 2 & 42 (maintaining that “it applies the standard in a way that it is met simply by an allegation of Canadian
law,” and finding that “[t]hey could have taken the matter to the Federal Court of Canada, which could have reviewed
the decision and perhaps overturned it”).
250
Metalclad supra note 119 paras 105-106 (basing its decision on its finding that “the Municipality acted outside its
authority” because “the exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the
Mexican federal government”—i.e. an issue of Mexican law that, in fact, was in dispute).
251
See e.g., Royal and Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88 (2d. Cir. 2006). Cf.
European Union Regulation No. 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), art 29 (creating a first-in-time rule except where the parties otherwise have
stipulated a court that has jurisdiction). For a general discussion on the complex relationship between domestic courts
and ISDS, see, Christopher Schreuer, Interactions of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (A. W.
Rovine ed.) 71 (2011).
252
NAFTA, supra note 226, at art. 1121.
253
CETA, supra note 47 at art. 8.19.6.
254
For discussion, see, Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners
Saga, 5 MEXICAN L. REV. 239 (2013) (noting use of Mexican courts under the NAFTA model, known as known as a
“no-U-turn” (or waiver) model.
249

45
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639

complementarity mechanisms can broaden international law’s reach. 255 There is some (at least
preliminary) empirical evidence that they do so better than the alternative of using international
tribunals as substitutes. 256 These mechanisms can provide better assurance to all investors—large
and small, foreign and domestic—thus reducing the cost of investment capital within the State. If
the processes avoid significantly greater delay than the ISDS or proposed international court
system—for instance, through tight standardized schedules (as under the WTO)—they should
provide assurance for foreign investors. In addition, because complementarity mechanisms trigger
interaction between national and international bodies, they can facilitate greater congruence
between international and national norms. 257 As a result, States may be less inclined to politicize
a conflict.
There are nonetheless potential disadvantages with this alternative. Some argue that there
is a level of expertise lost through the application of international law by domestic judges with
general jurisdiction. 258 Others contend that empowering domestic adjudicatory processes to apply
international law will catalyze new judicial politics domestically. 259 Increased interaction could
lead to politicization and friction between international and domestic courts as well, especially if
an international tribunal were to expressly overrule a domestic legal system’s highest court. 260
Complementarity mechanisms—depending on their design—also could create significant delay
and increase the cost of dispute settlement. 261 If so, this could prejudice investors, which could be
deterred from investing. 262
From the vantage of comparative institutional analysis, the potential complexity, delay,
and increased cost of complementarity mechanisms create a risk of minoritarian bias, since large
255
Van Aaken, supra note 199 at 754 (arguing that “[I[f investment law is a kind of international administrative law,
a harmonious combination and an alignment of the internationalized system of state liability and the national systems
seems desirable”); Dodge, supra note […] at 5–8 (favoring the exhaustion of local remedies). See also Richard C.
Chen, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic Institutional Reform, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 547 (2017).
256
See Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment
for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (2011) (providing empirical evidence that that international
dispute settlement mechanisms have more impact when they complement an existing set of effective domestic
institutions); and Ginsburg, supra note 186 at 119 (providing empirical evidence that ISDS may “reduce courts’
incentives to improve performance by depriving key actors from a need to invest in institutional improvement”).
257
Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute
Resolution, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004) (“First, adjudicative expression may construct focal points that
clarify ambiguities in the convention. Second, adjudicative expression may provide signals that cause parties to update
their beliefs about the facts that determine how the convention applies”); RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015).
258
August Reinisch, The International Relations of National Courts: A Discourse on International Law Norms on
Jurisdictional and Enforcement Immunity, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER
NEUHOLD 289, 307 (Reinisch, August & Kriebaum, Ursula eds., 2007)
259
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 440-3 (1998)
(questioning whether domestic courts should play an active role in enforcing international commitments in light of
the opaque nature of the treaty-making process, and the vagueness of many of the treaty provisions that pose federalism
issues).
260
Apparently, this was a reason why the European Commission, in the end, did not require exhaustion of local
remedies in its proposal for a multilateral investment court system. Interview with official of the European
Commission, Brussels, May 16, 2018.
261
Cf. Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?, 4 GLOBAL ARB. REV., no. 5, 2009 (reporting
that the average length of an ICSID arbitration is 3.6 years); and BONNITCHA ET AL, supra note 88 at ch. 3 (finding
that “this is more than twice the duration for litigation in domestic courts in selected developed countries”).
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Christoph H. Schreuer, Do We Need Investment Arbitration?, 11 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 10 (2014) (arguing
that “the primary victims of [increase of cost and time] would be small and medium sized investors”).
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investors with large stakes are better positioned than others to use such mechanisms. In addition,
because investors no longer would have direct access to an international body, some could
relinquish justified claims because of the increased costs, and thus local majoritarian bias would
not be countered.
The key disadvantage of these mechanisms is that their effectiveness depends on the good
faith of national courts. Reference procedures, for example, depend on whether national courts
refer questions to the international body, since such referrals may not be under the parties’ control.
If national courts are not independent of the government, then references may not occur.
Exhaustion of local remedies rules function only when domestic courts provide real access to
justice, as opposed to endless delay in favor of the State. Without some level of trust in national
courts, complementarity mechanisms could play into the hands of States that use the prospect of
endless delay to extract concessions from aggrieved investors.
Nonetheless, complementarity mechanisms facilitate the ability of all stakeholders to
advance claims and counterclaims regarding an investment dispute because they prioritize the use
of domestic mechanisms. They thus can be less one-sided and asymmetric than international
adjudicatory mechanism such as ISDS or a multilateral investment court system used as
substitutes. In this way, they can better protect against potential minoritarian bias in favor of highstakes investors, which is a common criticism of ISDS. As counter-majoritarian institutions,
domestic courts can also check majoritarian biases in domestic decision-making, while being better
situated to account for domestic local contexts.
As previously discussed, domestic courts can also be subject to bias. In the case of
complementarity mechanisms, however, these biases can be checked. An international tribunal is
held in reserve to help support and assure that domestic processes function as intended. In this
way, complementarity mechanisms can address the relative deficiencies of relying solely on
domestic mechanisms or, alternatively, solely on international adjudicatory processes.
In the end, the effectiveness of complementarity mechanisms depends on the existence of
some level of judicial independence and impartiality in the domestic jurisdiction, combined with
some level of trust across the domestic/international divide. Where these conditions are present,
complementarity mechanisms can be both fair and effective. Moreover, they can work dynamically
to enhance rule-of-law protections over time. Where these conditions are lacking, then
complementarity mechanisms could be dysfunctional or at least increase the cost of dispute
settlement. As in all cases, the imperfections of these complementary options must be weighed
against those of other institutional alternatives.
V. CONCLUSION
While institutional choice is always contextual and thus always difficult, comparative
institutional analysis is essential because all institutional options are imperfect and subject to tradeoffs. Market options may not be available in many situations, especially for small- and mediumsized investors. Domestic mechanisms may not be independent or impartial, lacking basic rule-oflaw protections. Diplomacy tends to favor powerful States, as well as influential firms that lobby
them. Interstate dispute settlement can politicize disputes and still be tilted in favor of powerful
actors, whether they be States or large corporations that have privileged access to State officials.
For these reasons, many States turned to what is now the most frequently used
mechanism—ISDS—but it too has many deficiencies. The system of appointment of arbitrators
creates perverse incentives; there is no appeal mechanism to provide for consistency and a check
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on poor decisions; and inconsistent decisions made by ad hoc tribunals limit the law’s expressive
value. A multilateral investment court system seems better on many counts. Yet it also is remote
from domestic publics and its decisions could be resisted on sovereignty grounds.
In sum, it is difficult to decide in the abstract which institutional option is preferable. The
primary goal, in our view, should be supporting the domestic rule of law. Thus, we highlight the
importance of complementarity as an institutional option, an attribute that neither the current ISDS
system nor the proposed multilateral investment court system prioritizes, although they could be
adapted to do so, including through the current UNCITRAL reform process. From this perspective,
national courts should be the first-line actors for resolving disputes, and other institutional
mechanisms should provide incentives for enhancing the rule-of-law.
Contexts differ across States, and choices should depend on those contexts. Where basic
rule-of-law norms are protected, then the costs of an additional international system of review may
not be worthwhile. Rather, reliance may be better placed on national courts, backed by market
mechanisms. Where a State, in contrast, lacks independent, impartial, quality courts, an
international mechanism that provides for investor standing to bring claims is of much greater
importance. In some contexts, States may prefer not to include a system of exhaustion of local
remedies so as to streamline the process. A State can then provide greater assurance to investors.
In this context, a permanent court with an appellate mechanism appears to be a superior model to
ISDS because it would more likely be attentive to a State’s public policy interests, and it would
provide for greater consistency and coherence across decisions.
Including national courts in decision-making offers advantages for building the domestic
rule of law dynamically over time. For transitional States, ones where courts are developing in
their professionalism and independence, a system of complementarity seems more appropriate.
When rule-of-law norms are advanced through international law and become embedded in
domestic governance, they can contribute to the creation of a broader “rule-of-law” transnational
legal order. 263
We do not claim to have found an institutional option that is best across all contexts or
through time. Adopting a legal realist perspective, 264 the primary goal of this Article is to present
and apply an analytic framework that helps to clarify the trade-offs of different institutional options
for international investment law. The option chosen will be a function of context involving
particular factors, such as a State’s capital endowment, market size, ideology, institutional
development, and historical legacy. 265 The tailoring of institutional choice can be met by what
Anthea Roberts describes as ongoing pluralism and flexibility in the architecture of institutional
mechanisms. 266 Looking forward, our analysis reveals that the international investment regime
should not simply rely on ISDS. Nor should it be replaced with a multilateral investment court
system that applies to all countries unless such system provides for significant flexibility, such as
through opt out and opt in provisions. 267 Maintaining flexibility will likely be key, a flexibility that
See Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TERENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (2015).
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permits States facing different challenges to select from a menu of imperfect international
alternatives in light of their trade-offs. That flexibility should include experimentation with
different complementarity mechanisms.

different options. See Susan BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 80-82, 233-236, 257-259, 396-397 (2017). Similarly, the
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement creates different categories of obligations that become binding on different
members at different times, including as a function of receipt of technical assistance. It provides an example of
flexibility mechanisms that serves as a template for new proposals before the WTO, including regarding investment.
See WTO, Trade Facilitation Agreement, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions for Least Developed
Countries (LDC) available https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tfa_ldc_brochure_e.doc
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